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 ABSTRACT 
This project concerns a deeply contested moral ideal: autonomy. To be 
autonomous is to have authority over one’s self and to govern one’s life on the basis of 
value commitments one deems important. One of the dominant views of liberalism – 
antiperfectionist comprehensive liberalism – distinguishes itself from other liberal views 
because it grants unique privilege to the ideal of autonomy in personal and political life. 
Will Kymlicka is one of the most prominent defenders of antiperfectionist comprehensive 
liberalism and while he appeals to the ideal of autonomy in his liberalism, he is not clear 
about which theory of autonomy he is appealing to. As a result, his theory of autonomy is 
sketchy and incomplete. As an autonomy theorist, I think that there is more Kymlicka can 
say to elaborate on the view of autonomy operating in his theory of liberalism. Kymlicka 
has not explained whether his view is a procedural, or substantive, or a socio-relational 
view and these exhaust the kinds of views of autonomy in the literature, so Kymlicka's 
view must be one of these. It is important for Kymlicka to be clear on the view of 
autonomy he incorporates because each theory has its own motivating assumptions and 
standards for what counts as an autonomous choice. In addition, it is important for 
Kymlicka to be clear about the theory of autonomy in his liberalism, because, in some 
cases, the standards for autonomy may be inconsistent with his liberal commitments. In 
this project, I argue that Kymlicka incorporates a socio-relational view of autonomy in 
his liberalism.
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 LIBERALISM AND AUTONOMY 
Introduction 
This project concerns a deeply contested moral ideal: autonomy. To be 
autonomous is to have authority over one’s self and to govern one’s life on the basis of 
value commitments one deems important.1 Autonomy is a concept that plays a prominent 
role in several subfields of philosophy, including political philosophy, where there is a 
debate over the role of autonomy in liberalism. It’s no secret that all liberal theorists 
regard autonomy as an important moral ideal. Indeed, we can say that the “basic 
organizing idea” of liberalism is the following, namely “the fundamental value of an 
individual’s rationally and autonomously pursuing or embracing those things she judges 
to be worthwhile.”2 In other words, liberal theorists think that it is valuable for 
individuals to be autonomous, to shape their lives freely and as they see fit. Liberal 
theorists, however, disagree over what this commitment to autonomy means for liberal 
theorizing.3 This disagreement emerges over two key questions. First, liberal thinkers 
                                                 
1
 When I refer to “value commitments,” I intend this is to include religious or philosophical 
beliefs, moral ideals, moral principles, and character traits.  
2
 John Christman, Social and Political Philosophy: A Contemporary Introduction, New York: 
Routledge, 2002, 96.  
3
 I follow Jonathan Quong’s formulation of these two debates. See Liberalism Without Perfection, 




disagree over whether a necessary feature of liberalism is a claim about the good life. In 
particular, is liberal theory itself based upon a particular ideal such as the autonomous 
life? Call this the character question.4 Second, liberal thinkers disagree over the role of 
the liberal state in promoting the good life to its citizens. More precisely, should the 
liberal state promote the autonomous life? Call this the practice question.5  
While there are four main liberal theories, each of which provides different 
answers to these two questions, my project will focus upon one theory in particular: 
antiperfectionist comprehensive liberalism (henceforth APCL). APCL distinguishes itself 
from other liberal views because it answers the character and practice questions by appeal 
to the ideal of personal autonomy. Defenders of APCL claim that 1) liberal theory is 
committed to an ideal of personal autonomy as an intrinsically valuable way of life and 
that 2) the state should remain neutral and refrain from the active promotion of valuable 
ways of living over other reasonable alternatives, in the interest of protecting personal 
autonomy. One of the most prominent defenses of APCL in the literature is offered by 
Will Kymlicka and I focus exclusively on his view in this project.6 Here’s why. While 
Kymlicka appeals to the ideal of autonomy in his liberalism, he is not clear about which 
theory of autonomy he is appealing to. As a result, his theory of autonomy is sketchy and 
                                                 
4
 Quong identifies this as the first question “about the fundamental character of liberal 
philosophy,” which he poses in the following way: “Must liberal philosophy be based in some particular 
ideal of what constitutes a valuable or worthwhile life, or other metaphysical beliefs?” (Liberalism Without 
Perfection, 15). 
5
 Quong identifies this as the second question “about the practice of liberal states,” (16), which he 
poses as follows: “Is it permissible for a liberal state to promote or discourage some activities, ideals, or 
ways of life on grounds relating to their inherent or intrinsic value, or on the basis of some other 
metaphysical claims?” (Liberalism Without Perfection, 15).   
6
 Kymlicka’s first articulation of his view is in Liberalism, Community, and Culture, Oxford: 





incomplete. As an autonomy theorist, I argue that Kymlicka must be clear about the 
theory of autonomy he has in mind when he incorporates the ideal in his liberalism. After 
all, there are several different theories of autonomy, each with its own motivating 
assumptions and standards for what counts as an autonomous choice. In addition, it is 
important to be clear on the theory of autonomy one incorporates in his view of 
liberalism, because, in some cases, the standards for autonomy may be inconsistent with 
one’s liberal commitments. So, the primary aim of my project is to explain what theory of 
autonomy is operating implicitly in Kymlicka’s liberalism. I explain each of these 
theories of autonomy briefly in this chapter, but I can say now that there are four main 
accounts in the literature: proceduralist, strong substantivist, weak substantivist, and 
socio-relational. These exhaust the kinds of views of autonomy in the literature, so 
Kymlicka's view must be one of these. The central claim of my project is this: I argue 
that Kymlicka’s view of autonomy in his liberalism is socio-relational.  
I think if we are clear on the standards for autonomy associated with Kymlicka’s 
liberalism, then this will serve two important ends. First, my project is bringing to the 
surface something important for Kymlicka’s view: the account of autonomy he 
incorporates in his theory of liberalism is socio-relational. Two, identifying the standards 
for autonomy associated with Kymlicka’s account of liberalism will provide a novel way 
for him to respond to his critics. I devote this chapter to elaborating on the fundamental 






I begin this section with a disclaimer: I am proceeding on the admittedly 
controversial assumption that liberal theorists ought to endorse Kymlicka’s view of 
liberalism. I acknowledge that critics of Kymlicka’s liberalism have raised serious 
concerns about the viability of the position.7 I leave a full-scale defense of Kymlicka’s 
particular approach to liberal theory for another time, but let me say this briefly. I think 
part of the reason why theorists are critical of Kymlicka’s account of liberalism stems 
from misunderstandings about the view itself. In particular, I think that theorists 
misunderstand the role that autonomy plays in Kymlicka’s liberalism and we can trace 
this confusion in part to the incomplete account of autonomy Kymlicka incorporates 
within his view. Accordingly, this provides some of the motivation behind my project. 
A second disclaimer: while I discuss only Kymlicka’s defense of APCL in this 
project, it would be a mistake to think that APCL is “one single theory.”8 While 
Kymlicka offers one prominent defense of the view, there are others, including John 
Locke, Theory of Justice-era John Rawls, and Ronald Dworkin.9 Nevertheless, however 
one defends the theory, any account of APCL grant unique privilege to the ideal of 
autonomy in personal and political life. We see evidence of this in how APCL theorists 
                                                 
7
 Quong in particular has raised one of the most recent critiques of APCL in general. See 
Liberalism Without Perfection, 22-26.   
8
 Quong, Liberalism Without Perfection, 24.  
9
 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, Ian Shapiro, ed., New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 2003; John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971; Ronald 
Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2002. Following Quong, I include Dworkin as an APCL theorist, even though his account of 
liberalism is couched in a defense of equality, not autonomy per se, because his “‘challenge model’ of the 




respond to the character and practice questions. Let’s consider how Kymlicka responds to 
these key questions. 
First, the character question: Is liberalism based on a view about what constitutes 
a good or flourishing life? As I noted, APCL theorists usually refer to personal autonomy 
when answering this question. However, Kymlicka offers a unique answer to the 
character question. Even though Kymlicka is an APCL theorist, the ideal of personal 
autonomy plays only an indirect role in his formulation of liberalism.10 To be sure, 
Kymlicka thinks that autonomy is a valuable ideal, but he doesn’t regard autonomy as 
valuable for its own sake.11 Rather, Kymlicka claims that autonomy is instrumentally 
valuable because it contributes to our essential interest in leading an objectively good life. 
According to Kymlicka, it is this essential interest – and not autonomy as such – that 
“forms the basis of liberal political theory.”12  
What is an objectively good life on Kymlicka’s view? Kymlicka doesn’t offer a 
particular account of the good because he thinks there is a wide range of objectively good 
lives that individuals can lead. But, Kymlicka does claim that for any objectively good 
life, it must be led from the inside.13 According to Kymlicka, “no life goes better by 
being led from the outside according to values the person doesn’t endorse. My life only 
                                                 
10
 Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture, 10-13. 
11
 As Kymlicka notes in Liberalism, Community, and Culture, some theorists (notably Rawls) 
suggest that our essential interest (or ‘higher order interest’, in Rawls’s terminology) “is in our capacity to 
form and revise our rational plans of life,” (11). In other words, Rawls is saying that our essential interest 
lies in being autonomous.  But, Kymlicka (following Ronald Dworkin) claims that “this puts the cart before 
the horse,” (12). Here, Kymlicka quotes Dworkin: “Our higher-order interest is not an interest in exercising 
a capacity because we find that we have it...but rather we develop and train capacities of the sort that [they] 
describe because we have a certain interest,” namely the interest in leading a life that is good (12, emphasis 
mine).  
12
 Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture, 13.  
13




goes better if I’m leading it from the inside, according to my beliefs about values.”14 
Liberal theorists refer to this as the endorsement constraint and it is important to note that 
Kymlicka regards it as a fundamental aspect of his liberalism for the following reason. 
While each of us has an essential interest in leading an objectively good life, it is also 
possible that we are mistaken about what constitutes this kind of life. It is easy to 
understand how we might make this error. Identifying the beliefs that we think matter 
most is a difficult, sometimes agonizing, task. We have limited reasoning faculties and 
sometimes we reason incorrectly, so the value commitments we hold may not lead us to 
live an objectively good life. Sometimes, we simply change our minds, so the value 
commitments we identify today may not be right for us in the future. We must make 
difficult decisions, yet we know we are fallible. However, even if we are (or can be) in 
the wrong about what the good life consists in, other people cannot step in and correct 
our errors, in hopes of making our life go better. On Kymlicka’s view, the endorsement 
constraint prevents us from intervening in this way. A person who isn’t leading his life 
from the inside, i.e. who is coerced by external factors to hold or reject certain beliefs, 
will not be leading a good life. A person must lead his life from the inside, even if he is 
leading his life according to objectively bad values. So, when does a person lead his life 
from the inside? According to Kymlicka, one of the necessary conditions for leading life 
from the inside is that one is autonomous. In other words, a person must be able to self-
govern on the basis of what he thinks are valuable pursuits and moral ideals, even if these 
pursuits and ideals are “wrong” from some better perspective. 
                                                 
14




How, then, does Kymlicka understand the ideal of autonomy? According to 
Kymlicka, to be autonomous, one must have certain capacities.15 In particular, one must 
have the ability to arrive at her values in the proper way and the ability to rationally 
revise one’s good. Furthermore, to be autonomous, individuals require certain rights and 
liberties, and cultural conditions (e.g. freedom of the press, freedom of association) in 
order to exercise her capacities for autonomy.16 For example, a liberal state grants 
political and civil rights to individuals, which rights provide them formal guarantees that 
they can (say) pursue whatever religious or philosophical beliefs they wish without 
persecution.  
Let’s put all of these claims together. As an APCL theorist, Kymlicka claims that 
liberalism is based upon the idea that each of us has an essential interest in leading an 
objectively good life. For any objectively good life, it is led from the inside, because a 
person’s life only goes well when she leads it from the inside, according to values she 
deems important from her own perspective. One necessary condition for leading life from 
the inside is that one is autonomous. Thus, being autonomous is a necessary condition for 
leading an objectively good life. 
However, while autonomy plays only an indirect role in Kymlicka’s liberalism, it 
is an important feature of his overall view. As I stated earlier, it is my claim in this 
project that Kymlicka’s account of autonomy is incomplete. As an autonomy theorist, I 
think that there is more Kymlicka can say to elaborate on the view of autonomy operating 
in his theory of liberalism. Kymlicka hasn’t explained whether his view is procedural, 
                                                 
15
 Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture, 13.  
16




strong substantivist, weak substantivist, or socio-relational and these exhaust the kinds of 
views of autonomy in the literature, so Kymlicka's view must be one of these. We need to 
know what kind of view of autonomy Kymlicka is advocating because there are different 
standards for different views, and the standards for autonomy tell us what conditions 
must obtain in order that a person counts as autonomous. Moreover, the standards 
associated with some views of autonomy are inconsistent with certain liberal 
commitments, so it is important for Kymlicka to be clear about what theory of autonomy 
he is endorsing in his liberalism.  
So far, I’ve explained Kymlicka’s answer to the character question and now I turn 
to examining his answer to the practice question. What role, if any, should the state play 
in promoting the good life to its citizens? Some liberal theorists say that the state should 
be perfectionist.17 Perfectionism is the claim that humans have a particular nature and 
that, given this nature, there are goods any human must have, in order to lead an excellent 
life. For example, one might think that the capacity for rationality is an essential part of 
human nature and that it is a perfectionist good for individuals to develop their rational 
capacities.18 Along the same lines, a perfectionist liberal view holds that the state is 
justified in identifying and advancing through its policies and laws objectively good 
human ways of living, regardless of whether individuals recognize or endorse that way of 
                                                 
17
 Some of perfectionist comprehensive liberalism’s most prominent defender are Joseph Raz , The 
Morality of Freedom, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988; William Galston, Liberal Purposes: Good, Virtues, 
and Diversity in the Liberal State, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991; Stephen Wall, 
Liberalism, Perfectionism, and Restraint, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
18
 Steven Wall, “Perfectionism in Moral and Political Philosophy,” Stanford Encyclopedia of 




living as good, though within the boundaries of justice.19 Defenders of perfectionist 
liberalism claim that the state plays an active and essential role in evaluating and 
promoting particular ways of living over others (and penalizing those who favour less 
worthy ways of life).  In contrast, Kymlicka thinks that the liberal state should maintain a 
neutral position between objectively good ways of living endorsed by individuals. This 
means that the state is not justified in actively promoting certain ways of living over 
others to citizens or in justifying its day-to-day policies and laws by appeal to certain 
conceptions of the good. According to Kymlicka, the role of the state is to provide and 
regulate a neutral framework in which citizens can pursue their good. Negatively, this 
means that the state cannot evaluate or make judgments about citizens’ conceptions of the 
good (provided that these conceptions are “justice-respecting”).20 If a person’s 
conception of the good is “justice-respecting” – even if one’s life is characterized by 
(say) vulgarity or misanthropy – then it is not the place of the state to weigh in on 
whether that conception really is worthy of pursuit or whether the person pursing it merits 
resources.21Positively, the state is responsible for protecting individuals’ capacity for 
                                                 
19
 John Christman, Social and Political Philosophy: A Contemporary Introduction, 104. In other 
words, perfectionist liberal states cannot force or coerce individuals into accepting one set of beliefs or 
values over another. Indeed, given that liberals from Locke onward have argued against the effectiveness of 
forcing citizens to profess or reject a particular faith, it seems that the PCL state should avoid using 
coercion. But, some critics wonder whether it is possible for the perfectionist liberal state to refrain from 
coercing citizens to accept a particular way of life, even if perfectionist liberalism is constrained by liberal 
ideals. See Alfonso J. Damico, “What’s Wrong with Liberal Perfectionism,” Polity, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Spring 
1997), 397-420, 399. 
20
 The term “justice-respecting” is Kymlicka’s, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An 
Introduction, Second Edition, p. 217. I say more about this in Chapter 5. 
21
 Of course, even if some people are leading immoral but “justice-respecting” lives, it is open to 
others around her to “remonstrate with these people, reason with them, entreat them, persuade them, and if 
that does not work, avoid their company. But it is not a reason for compelling them or taking political 




autonomy, so that they can determine for themselves what counts as a worthy conception 
of the good, without state intrusion, and the state has a positive duty to provide equally to 
citizens the proper means and resources to pursue whatever their “justice-respecting” 
conceptions of the good.22  
How does Kymlicka defend neutrality? It will be instructive to identify, in order 
to set aside, one possible argumentative strategy. While some liberal thinkers claim that 
neutrality is (or ought to be) defended by appeal to sceptical considerations,23 Kymlicka 
rejects this line of thinking. He does not advocate neutrality because we are unable to 
know whether certain conceptions of the good are more valuable than others.24 Instead, 
Kymlicka offers three different lines of argument to defend neutrality. I consider these in 
depth in Chapter 5, but I’ll state them now. First, Kymlicka argues that perfectionist state 
action violates the endorsement constraint and it is self-defeating to violate it. Second, he 
argues that perfectionist state action interferes with individuals’ autonomy, in particular 
with the ability to rationally revise one’s good. Lastly, Kymlicka argues that perfectionist 
actions distort the cultural marketplace of ideas. Based on these considerations against 
state perfectionism, Kymlicka concludes that neutrality is preferable, i.e. a state which 
doesn’t actively promote certain ways of living over others or justify its policies and laws 
on the basis of certain conceptions of the good. 
                                                                                                                                                 
“Autonomy and Perfectionism in Raz’s Morality of Freedom,” Southern California Law Review, Vol. 62, 
1989, 1098-1152, 1133-1134.  
22
 Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction, Second Edition, 217-8.  
23
 See Brian Barry, Justice as Impartiality, New York: Oxford University Press, 1989, 169-182. 
24
 As Kymlicka points out, “scepticism does not in fact support self-determination. If people 
cannot make mistakes in their choices, then neither can governments. If all ways of life are equally 
valuable, then no one can complain when the government chooses a particular way of life for the 
community. Hence scepticism leaves the issue unresolved,” (Contemporary Political Philosophy: An 




Kymlicka faces two kinds of criticisms directed toward his stance on state 
neutrality. First, political liberals like Jonathan Quong argue that liberal views such as 
Kymlicka’s are inconsistent.25 How can Kymlicka claim that the liberal state ought to be 
neutral and justify neutrality by appeal to a normative ideal like autonomy? Isn’t 
neutrality clearly violated by this move? The second line of criticism comes from 
perfectionist comprehensive liberals like Joseph Raz, Thomas Hurka, and Richard 
Arneson and they argue that Kymlicka’s position on neutrality is incoherent. If Kymlicka 
claims that all individuals have an essential interest in leading a good life, why should the 
state remain neutral? That is, why shouldn’t the state take steps to actively ensure that 
citizens really are leading good lives? In this project, I think that by getting clear on 
Kymlicka’s theory of autonomy and the role it plays in his liberalism, Kymlicka will be 
in a better position to respond to his critics.  
Chapter Outlines 
As I stated at the outset, the central claim of this project is that Kymlicka’s view 
of autonomy in his liberalism is socio-relational. What is notable about a socio-relational 
view of autonomy is that it claims a person’s autonomy is largely constituted by her 
social conditions, although certain psychological states are also necessary for autonomy. 
As we shall see, Kymlicka’s view of autonomy must endorse these particular kinds of 
standards for autonomy as well. Put differently, I will argue that Kymlicka cannot 
endorse any view of autonomy except for a socio-relational view.  
In Chapter 2, I argue that Kymlicka’s view cannot be proceduralist. Roughly, a 
proceduralist theory of autonomy claims that a person is autonomous if she subjects (or 
                                                 
25




would subject) her value commitments to the “right” process of critical reflection.26 Put 
another way, proceduralist views say that if a person’s psychological states meet certain 
standards, then this is both necessary and sufficient for autonomy. While proceduralist 
theorists disagree over how to understand this process, such theories have been the 
dominant view in the literature since the 1970s.27 Part of the appeal of proceduralist 
theories is that they are content-neutral. A content-neutral view of autonomy does not 
require autonomous individuals to hold particular kinds of value commitments. What 
                                                 
 
26
 Some of the most prominent defenders of proceduralism are John Christman, Gerald Dworkin, 
Marilyn Friedman, Diana T. Meyers, and Andrea Westlund.  
 
For Christman, see “Autonomy and Personal History, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 20 (1990) 
1-24; “Liberalism and Individual Positive Freedom,” Ethics 101 (1991), 343-359; “Relational Autonomy, 
Liberal Individualism, and the Social Constitution of Selves,” Philosophical Studies 117 (2004): 143-164; 
“Procedural Autonomy and Liberal Legitimacy,” in James Stacey Taylor (ed.) Personal Autonomy: New 
Essays on Autonomy and Its Role in Contemporary Moral Philosophy, New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005; “Autonomy, Self-Knowledge, and Liberal Legitimacy,” in Joel Anderson and John Christman 
(eds.), Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005;  The 
Politics of Persons. Individual Autonomy and Socio-historical Selves, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009.  
 
For Dworkin, see The Theory and Practice of Autonomy, New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1988.  
 
For Friedman, see M. “Autonomy and Social Relationships: Rethinking the Feminist Critique,” in 
Diana Tietjens Meyers (ed.) Feminists Rethink the Self Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997; Autonomy, Gender, 
Politics New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.  
 
For Meyers, “Personal Autonomy and the Paradox of Feminine Socialization,” Journal of 
Philosophy 84 (1987): 619:628; Self, Society and Personal Choice, New York: Columbia University Press, 
1989; “Feminism and Women’s Autonomy: The Challenge of Female Genital Cutting. Metaphilosophy 31 
(2000): 469-491; “Intersectional Identity and the Authentic Self. Opposites Attract!” in Catriona Mackenzie 
and Natalie Stoljar (eds.) Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency and the Social 
Self, New York: Oxford University Press, 2000; Gender in the Mirror: Cultural Imagery and Women’s 
Agency. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002; “Decentralizing Autonomy: Five Faces of Selfhood,” 
in Joel Anderson and John Christman (eds.), Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005.  
 
For Westlund, see “Rethinking Relational Autonomy,” Hypatia 24 (2009): 26-49. 
 
27
 See Harry Frankfurt “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” The Journal of 
Philosophy, Vol. 68, No. 1, January 1971, 5-20; Gerald Dworkin “Acting Freely,” Nous, 4 (November), 





matters for autonomy is that a person engages in the right sort of critical process. This 
means that individuals can hold a wide range of value commitments and count as 
autonomous. Proceduralist views are attractive because they set only minimal standards 
for autonomy related to a person’s critical abilities; as a result, individuals have great 
latitude with respect to the kinds of values they can hold and qualify as autonomous. 
However, because proceduralist views claim that psychological standards are necessary 
and sufficient for autonomy, this means that a person’s social conditions don’t play a role 
in establishing whether a person is autonomous. Put another way, defenders of 
proceduralism are claiming that social conditions are conceptually irrelevant for 
determining whether a person qualifies as autonomous. However, I will argue that 
Kymlicka doesn’t regard the social conditions as conceptually irrelevant for autonomy. I 
will argue that Kymlicka see social conditions as (at least partly) constitutive of a 
person’s autonomy. If this line of thinking is correct, then his view of autonomy cannot 
be proceduralist. 
If Kymlicka’s view of autonomy incorporates social conditions as constitutive for 
autonomy, one might think that he is offering a strong substantivist account of 
autonomy.28 While theorists offer different interpretations of these views, we can say 
roughly that strong substantive accounts hold that critical reflection is necessary but not 
sufficient for autonomy. Defenders of these views introduce substantive constraints on 
                                                 
28
 Among those who defend strong substantive views are Susan Babbitt, “Feminism and Objective 
Interests: The Role of Transformation Experiences in Rational Deliberation,” in Feminist Epistemologies, 
Linda Alcoff and Elizabeth Potter eds., New York: Routledge, 1993;  Natalie Stoljar, “Autonomy and the 
Feminist Intuition,” in Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social 
Self, Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar, eds., New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, 94-111; 
Susan Wolf, “Asymmetrical Freedom,” The Journal of Philosophy 77 (1980), 151-166. Some autonomy 
theorists argue that Thomas Hill is a strong substantivist theorist, on the basis of claims he makes in 
Autonomy and Self-Respect Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. However, in Chapter 3, I 




the content of the value commitments an autonomous agent is permitted to endorse. On 
this view, a person must engage in critical reflection and her choices and preferences are 
subject to certain normative constraints. In particular, her choices and preferences must 
“hook up” in the proper way with an objective feature of the world, e.g. that she is a 
moral equal. However, I argue in Chapter 3 that because strong substantivist places 
restrictions on the kinds of choices and preferences that autonomous agents can hold, this 
is inconsistent with one aspect of Kymlicka’s view, namely his commitment to the 
endorsement constraint.  
After rejecting strong substantivist standards as inconsistent with Kymlicka’s 
liberalism, I consider next a relatively recent view introduced in the literature, namely 
weak substantivism.29 On this view, a person is autonomous if she critically reflects upon 
and endorses her value commitments in the proper way and holds the right kind of 
psychological attitudes toward her agency. Weak substantive accounts are supposed to be 
preferable to strong substantive and proceduralist views because they allow agents to 
hold a wide range of value commitments (even oppressive ones) while incorporating 
normatively robust standards. In other words, weak substantive theories carve a middle 
path between proceduralist and strong substantive views, retaining the positive aspects of 
these views while avoiding the problematic aspects. I argue that weak substantivism fails 
                                                 
29
 For weak substantive views, see Paul Benson, “Feminist Intuitions and the Normative Substance 
of Autonomy,” in Personal Autonomy: New Essays on Personal Autonomy and its Role in Contemporary 
Moral Philosophy, ed. James Stacey Taylor, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005, 128-142; Paul 
Benson, “Taking Ownership: Authority and Voice in Autonomous Agency,” in Autonomy and the 
Challenges to Liberalism: New Essays, John Christman and Joel Anderson, eds., Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005; Sigurdur Kristinsson, “The Limits of Neutrality: Toward a Weakly Substantive 





to provide a meaningful alternative theory of autonomy. My argument will proceed in 
two steps. First, I will argue that weak substantive standards are too weak to avoid the 
objection raised by proceduralist views of autonomy. As a result, I suggest that weak 
substantive views must incorporate more normatively rigorous standards in order to meet 
the objection. However, I will argue that the introduction of these standards will collapse 
weak substantivism into strong substantivism. This is because both views will count the 
very same cases as autonomous and nonautonomous. In other words, I am arguing that 
there is a distinction without a difference between weak substantive and strong 
substantive theories. From there, I present the second part of my argument. Because 
strong substantive standards are inconsistent with an important aspect of Kymlicka’s 
liberalism and because weak substantive standards collapse into strong substantive 
standards, Kymlicka’s view of autonomy in his liberalism is not weak substantive. 
Given that proceduralism, strong substantivism, weak substantivism, and socio-
relational views exhaust the kinds of views autonomy in the literature and if Kymlicka’s 
view is not proceduralist, nor strong substantivist, nor weak substantivist, then his view 
of autonomy must be socio-relational. I defend this claim in Chapter 4 and to make my 
argument, I appeal to Marina Oshana’s account of socio-relational autonomy.30 
According to this view, autonomy is largely constituted by the social conditions in which 
a person is embedded. A person is autonomous when her social conditions allow her to 
exercise de facto authority over her life. According to Oshana, a socio-relational view of 
autonomy is attractive because it avoids the problems that plague the other dominant 
views of autonomy and is more in line with our considered intuitions about what it is to 
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be autonomous. However, I argue that Oshana’s account of autonomy imposes 
restrictions on the kinds of value commitments an individual can hold and qualify as 
autonomous. In other words, Oshana’s view of autonomy is not content-neutral. If this 
line of thinking is correct, then this poses a serious problem, not only for her view, but for 
the central claim of my project as well. To avoid these problems, I argue that we can 
modify Oshana’s socio-relational view by incorporating content-neutrality. While this 
will weaken the standards for autonomy, I will argue that this move allows Oshana to 
avoid serious objections to her view and allows me to preserve my claim that Kymlicka’s 
account of autonomy is socio-relational.  
However, one long-standing criticism against Kymlicka’s particular approach to 
liberalism is that it cannot consistently maintain a commitment to neutrality.31 Here’s 
why. As we have seen, defenders of APCL (such as Kymlicka) say that liberalism is 
based upon an idea of the good life. But, critics claim that once we based liberalism upon 
a claim about what a flourishing life consists in, the state cannot help but to act for 
perfectionist reasons, i.e. to act to ensure that individuals really lead flourishing lives. If 
the state cannot refrain from acting in this way, in what sense, then, is the liberal state 
neutral? This problem seems to be exacerbated if I am right that Kymlicka incorporates a 
socio-relational theory of autonomy in his liberalism. By endorsing a socio-relational 
view of autonomy, Kymlicka is making a claim not only about the goodness of 
autonomous living, but about the kinds of social relations in which citizens ought to live. 
It seems transparently clear that Kymlicka is making perfectionist claims within his 
liberalism. Moreover, if these social relations are found to be lacking in the sense that 
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they prevent autonomous living, it seems the state is justified in stepping in to enact 
policies and laws that address the state of these social conditions. In doing so, however, 
the state would be appealing to controversial reasons to justify these laws and policies. In 
other words, Kymlicka’s view is inconsistent because it endorses both perfectionism and 
neutrality. 
In Chapter 5, I respond to this concern. First, I argue that we must be clear on 
precisely what “neutrality” is and what kinds of actions that a neutral state may take 
without violating its commitment to neutrality. While some theorists have characterized 
the neutral liberal state as “indifferent” toward its citizens, I think this way of describing 
the state is not only incorrect, it is misleading.32 Instead, we should understand neutrality 
as consisting of two commitments: neutrality of aim and neutrality of justification. 
Furthermore, I will argue that while Kymlicka’s critics are correct to say that his 
liberalism incorporates both perfectionist and antiperfectionist aspects, there is no 
inconsistency. 
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CHAPTER 2 
PROCEDURALIST THEORIES OF AUTONOMY 
Introduction
 I said earlier that, in rough terms, proceduralists regard autonomy as a 
psychological feature of an agent and thus claim that the standards or criteria for 
autonomy are internal or psychological in nature. Many autonomy theorists maintain that 
proceduralism represents the most reasonable and most intuitive view of autonomy, even 
if they disagree over how to cash out these standards. What is especially notable about 
such views, however, is the following, namely that proceduralists argue that internal or 
psychological standards are both necessary and sufficient for autonomy. According to 
proceduralists, our evaluations about a person’s autonomy depend solely upon the kinds 
of psychological states that result (or could result) from engaging in the right sort of 
critical reflection. No other considerations play a role in deciding whether a person is 
autonomous, including the kinds of social conditions in which a person lives. 
 In this chapter, I will elaborate on John Christman’s proceduralist account, which 
he refers to as an historical approach to autonomy. Indeed, throughout this project, I 
focus on Christman’s account for the following reasons. For one, autonomy theorists 
regard it as one of the most influential accounts of proceduralism in the literature. For 
another, Christman has developed and refined his view partly in response to the problems 




Christman’s view as representative of proceduralism, while also acknowledging that 
other theorists may conceptualize the view in slightly different terms. 
 My goal in this chapter is to argue that Kymlicka’s view of autonomy he employs 
in his theory of liberalism cannot be proceduralist. This is because Kymlicka and 
proceduralist theories are at odds over the role of social conditions in a theory of 
autonomy. As I will discuss in this chapter, while proceduralist theorists like Christman 
regard social conditions as only causally related to any reasonable theory of autonomy, 
Kymlicka views social conditions as part of the defining conditions for autonomy. Given 
that there is this deep disagreement between proceduralism and Kymlicka’s view of 
autonomy, his view cannot be proceduralist. To establish my claim, I examine 
Christman’s account of proceduralism in “Christman on Proceduralism” and Kymlicka’s 
view of autonomy in “Kymlicka and Proceduralism.” However, before this, I think it will 
be instructive to examine briefly the debate among autonomy theorists about the role of 
social conditions in a theory of autonomy. 
Autonomy and the Social World 
 In the 1980s, theorizing about autonomy took a “social turn,” wherein theorists 
began to take seriously the idea that social factors ought to play a central role when we 
think about and conceptualize autonomy.33 The “social turn” was fruitful for theorists, for 
it introduced new concepts and engendered new ways of thinking about autonomy and 
the autonomous agent. My aim here is not to rehearse them all but I want to consider two 
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important claims made by autonomy theorists. In turn, these remarks will shed light on 
understanding why proceduralists conceptualize autonomy in the way that they do.  
First, theorists proposed a new understanding of the individual who was capable 
of autonomy. With the “social turn,” autonomy theorists challenged the historically 
prevalent, traditional conception of the solitary, self-sufficient autonomous individual as 
a myth. In its place, theorists introduced the “social self” and an important part of this 
shift was to make apparent both the capacities and limitations of persons. Contrary to the 
traditional conception of the self, individuals capable of autonomy were not “social 
atoms,” independent from social influences and relations with others, but rather, as 
persons who are embedded within particular networks of social relations and who are (to 
a large extent) shaped by their social environment. Traditional conceptions of the self 
envisioned the rational and emotional capabilities of individuals as boundless: individuals 
could engage in radical self-creation, rationally selecting their ends and value 
commitments34 from a wide-range before them and were seen as capable of ignoring or 
setting aside entirely interpersonal relations, if one deemed it necessary to achieve one’s 
ends. In contrast, autonomy theorists now conceptualize the self more modestly, in that 
they do not regard individuals as capable of engaging in that kind of radical self-creation. 
According to the “social self” thesis, individuals do not “make themselves” ex nihilo by 
self-determining their ends and value commitments, but rather, they are constructed by 
their interactions with other individuals in the social sphere. Moreover, theorists pointed 
out that individuals do not in any robust sense “choose” their value commitments from a 
vast array of possibilities, but rather that individuals “find” or “recognize” the values that 
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matter to them as a result of being embedded with social relations. Furthermore, theorists 
claimed that the self cannot be separated from the social, historical, and physical location 
in which it is embedded. In other words, individuals could not escape the social forms 
and relations that influenced their self-development. Yet, most theorists caution against 
interpreting this claim to suggest that external forces totally determine individual selves 
or that changing particular aspects of oneself is impossible. Rather, it is because selves 
are embedded in this manner that makes it possible for selves to become selves in the first 
place or to alter or transform identity-conferring aspects of the self. That is, being 
embedded within a particular social, historical, and physical location provides a frame of 
reference for individual selves and supplies the “resources” needed when an individual 
imagines herself otherwise.  
However, while this embeddedness plays a crucial role for knowing oneself and 
knowing the world, a significant limitation also emerges. The social self, unlike the 
traditional conception of the self, has limited rational and reflective abilities because it is 
embedded. Agents cannot, as it were, fully “step back” from their own particular 
location, to reflect uninfluenced by their own perspective. One’s critical reflections will 
be piecemeal, partial, and incomplete and this includes reflections upon one’s own 
psychological states. Aspects of one’s identity may not be immediately accessible to one 
via introspection and one’s perception and assessment of one’s psychological states may 
not be veridical.35 
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Along with the new concept of the individual-as-socially-constructed, theorists 
also turned their attention to the nature of autonomy itself. Some theorists suggested that 
if the “social turn” shifted our understanding of the agent, then our concept of autonomy 
ought to be re-thought as well. In thinking about the concept of the person, theorists 
asked: how do social conditions influence individual self-development? Now, in thinking 
about the concept of autonomy itself, these theorists asked: how do external social 
conditions relate to the concept of autonomy? By social conditions, I refer to the wide 
range of phenomena that govern the relations between individuals as well as determine 
the kinds of ends individuals might pursue. Social conditions might refer to economic 
systems as well as religious traditions, social norms and institutions, and cultural and 
artistic practices. Among autonomy theorists, the debate over social conditions concerns 
the role that social conditions play when we conceptualize autonomy. Do social 
conditions play a background role in autonomy? If so, then we needn’t reference social 
conditions when deciding whether a person is autonomous. Or is it the case that social 
conditions are part of the definition of autonomy, such that if these conditions were 
deficient or absent altogether, then individuals would fail to count as autonomous?36  
According to the proceduralist, social conditions are part of the background 
conditions for autonomy, rather than part of the definition of autonomy. Another way to 
understand the proceduralist position is to say that social conditions are causally 
necessary for autonomy as opposed to conceptually necessary, and here is the 
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difference.37 The proceduralist would identify education or an adequate range of options 
as important background conditions for autonomy because the former can contribute to or 
impede the development of a person’s capacity for autonomy while the latter can 
contribute to effective critical reflection on one’s value commitments. However, in the 
final analysis to determine whether one is autonomous, proceduralists consider only one’s 
psychological states, and not the particular background features of one’s social 
environment. On the proceduralist view, the explanation for why a person counts as 
autonomous has nothing to do with external social conditions. 
How, then, does the proceduralist defend the claim that conditions focused on an 
agent’s critical reflections (rather than her external conditions) are necessary and 
sufficient for autonomy? Defenders of proceduralism claim that the view is motivated by 
two, different intuitions about autonomy. The first intuition is this: autonomy seems to 
require a large space of noninterference in which individuals can identify and pursue their 
good as they see fit.  Proceduralist theorists argue that one important way to capture this 
intuition is to exclude social conditions in the definition of autonomy. After all, requiring 
that autonomous agents live in particular kinds of social conditions reduces the space of 
noninterference because some conditions will be deemed as incompatible with 
autonomous living. However, if we identify relatively thin conditions for autonomy, this 
provides to individuals the greatest possible space to self-govern, or to identify and to 
live according to the beliefs they deem valuable. 
                                                 
37
 Holger Baumann makes the same distinction in “Reconsidering Relational Autonomy: Personal 
Autonomy for Socially Embedded and Temporally Extended Selves,” Analyse and Kritik, 30 (2008), 445-




The second intuition that motivates proceduralism is this: value commitments “are 
valid for a person when she can autonomously come to see their import.”38 Here’s what I 
take the proceduralist to be saying: unless I decide and endorse my values from my own 
perspective, I will not see the significance of these values for myself. We can put the 
point another way: when someone or something external to my perspective determines 
the values I should endorse, I cannot see the validity of these values for myself. 
According to its defenders, proceduralist views capture this intuition in another important 
feature of the view: proceduralist theorists place no normative restrictions on the kinds of 
value commitments autonomous agents can endorse or the kinds of choices they can 
make. This is why autonomy theorists refer to proceduralist accounts as content-neural. 
There is no “right” set of beliefs or value framework that an individual must endorse to 
be autonomous. Instead, what matters for a person’s autonomy is that she engages (or 
could engage) in the proper critical processes. Proceduralism denies that it has a complete 
perspective, decided in advance, on the kinds of lives an autonomous agent might lead 
but rather, leaves it up to agents to determine how they might live. Proceduralism simply 
identifies a decision-procedure for autonomy, rather than a prescription for the good life, 
and this ensures that individuals are living according to values they endorse from their 
own perspective.  
Christman on Proceduralism 
So far, I’ve made only general remarks about the proceduralist view of autonomy 
and the intuitions behind it. It is my claim that Kymlicka’s view of autonomy is not 
proceduralist, but before I make this argument, I want to expand upon Christman’s 
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particular conception of proceduralism. However, one might ask: why consider only 
Christman’s view, especially given that there are other proceduralist views in the 
literature? As I mentioned earlier, Christman has refined his view over a long period of 
time, so autonomy theorists regard it as a sophisticated view that bears out the two 
motivating intuitions I mentioned above.39 Nevertheless, whether I consider one account 
of proceduralism or all of them, my overarching point would remain the same: 
Kymlicka’s view of autonomy can’t be proceduralist and this is true of any account of 
proceduralism. So, in making my argument about Kymlicka’s view of autonomy, my 
argument is not that there is something about Christman’s view in particular which 
explains why Kymlicka’s view is not proceduralist. If this was my claim, then we could 
simply appeal to another proceduralist view in the literature.  
As I mentioned earlier, proceduralists view autonomy as an internal, 
psychological phenomenon. To put the proceduralist position somewhat crudely, 
autonomy is a function of “what is happening in your mind,” rather than “what is 
happening in your external environment.” We can clarify what the proceduralist position 
by considering the following scenario.40 Jane lives within a community which is 
characterized by gendered social hierarchies and which subscribes to very traditional 
gender roles as a matter of religious faith. In Jane’s community, women are strictly wives 
and mothers, while men are pursue careers outside the home. While women are expected 
to manage the households and raise children without complaint, they are also expected to 
“submit” to their husband’s authority in all important economic, social, and sexual 
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decisions, as well as decisions about how many children they will have. Women are 
required to be subordinate to male authority because women in Jane’s community are 
regarded as inferior to men, both socially and spiritually. Certainly, some of us, including 
proceduralists, may recoil at these kinds of social relations, not only because they are 
deeply inegalitarian, they also seem oppressive. Nevertheless, Jane is fully committed to 
her community and her faith, and she thinks that the social arrangements in which she 
lives are the best kind of social relations to live in. Is Jane autonomous with respect to her 
value commitment to female subordination? 
On Christman’s proceduralist account, this answer would be “yes,” providing that 
Jane meets (or could meet) the following conditions. If Jane were to reflect critically 
upon her value commitment, in light of the historical processes by which it arose, and 
would not feel alienated from it, then she is autonomous.41 If a person’s reflections would 
produce a sense of alienation, then she is nonautonomous with respect to that 
commitment.42 Like other proceduralist accounts, Christman’s view emphasizes 
reflective competency and agential authenticity as necessary components of autonomy. 
Competency conditions ensure that a person is self-governing while authenticity 
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conditions ensure that the governing is “her own.” So, on the one hand, the conditions for 
competency “pick out those characteristics by which a person effectively makes 
competent decisions,” and these include “rationality, self-control, freedom from 
psychosis and other pathologies, access to minimally accurate information, motivational 
effectiveness and the like.”43 On the other hand, the conditions for authenticity refer to 
“requirements that the person’s values and decisions are truly her own; these most often 
include the condition that persons reflect on their personal characteristics and identify 
with (or at least not feel deeply alienated from) them.”44 But, unlike some other 
proceduralist accounts, Christman’s view is an historical approach to autonomy. I think it 
will to be helpful at this point to make some brief observations about Christman’s reasons 
for adopting an historical account of autonomy in the first place. 
Many proceduralist theorists have defended what is referred to as a “hierarchical” 
account of autonomy. On this view, a person must engage in second-order reflection on 
her first-order value commitments claim and endorse them or identify with them, in order 
to be autonomous.45 Hierarchical views have been very influential in the literature, 
largely in part to their intuitive appeal. If autonomy is self-governance on the basis of 
values that are “one’s own,” then hierarchical views seem to provide a reasonable 
procedure for identifying and endorsing one’s values. Moreover, hierarchical views are 
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content-neutral. What matters for autonomy is that individuals submit their values to the 
proper critical evaluations, and not the substantive content of these values. Nevertheless, 
even critics sympathetic to proceduralism have raised several objections against 
hierarchical views, but rather than rehearse all of them, I consider two here because they 
will shed further light on Christman’s motivations behind his historical view of 
proceduralism. 
First, a problem with hierarchical accounts is that they cannot account for the 
following intuition, namely that if a person endorses her value commitments as a result of 
oppressive socialization or manipulation, then she is not autonomous.46 For example, 
suppose that all of my value commitments were implanted in me two days ago by a 
malevolent neurosurgeon. Suppose further that I reflected upon and endorsed my first-
order value commitments at the second-order level. On a hierarchical view, I would count 
as autonomous, but this is counterintuitive. I may have reflected on and endorsed “my” 
commitments, but given that I hold my values simply on the basis of what the 
neurosurgeon decided, it seems odd to say that these are my values. Similarly, suppose I 
have been oppressively socialized to hold certain beliefs about the rightness of gender 
hierarchy. Even if I reflect upon my first-order commitments at the second-order level 
and thus count as autonomous, many theorists think this is counterintuitive. This is 
because individuals who are oppressively socialized are trained to identify with the 
values and beliefs that arise from their socialization. As such, it’s not clear whether an 
oppressively socialized individual’s reflections are “her own” or the product of her 
oppressive upbringing. Christman agrees with these criticisms of hierarchical accounts, 
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but thinks that incorporating historical conditions – that is, conditions concerning the 
historical process by which an individual acquires her values – will render hierarchical 
accounts more intuitively appealing.47 On Christman’s view, the historical constraint 
works to ensure that individuals who are oppressively socialized or manipulated by 
malevolent neurosurgeons do not count as autonomous by considering the process behind 
the formation of their beliefs. 
Second, critics of hierarchical views have taken issue with the idea of “identify 
with.” As Christman notes, “the notion of ‘identification’ is problematically ambiguous 
between acknowledgement and endorsement.”48 On the one hand, I might aim to be a 
more generous person and identify with this trait, but my failure to be generous “should 
not disqualify [me] from being autonomous.”49 On the other hand, I might identify with 
my preference for smoking cigarettes as “part of who I am” but identifying with this 
particular preference does not seem to establish my autonomy. Moreover, identification is 
too rigorous to allow for the possibility that a person might feel ambivalent toward her 
value commitments. As Christman points out, some of us have “elements of the self” 
which we would not reject but which we do not regard as “ideal from our point of 
view.”50 Put another way, some of us have traits that we do not identify with fully but 
acknowledge as “part of who we are.”  Nevertheless, Christman argues that ambivalence 
shouldn’t make a person nonautonomous, so Christman aims to identify a conception of 
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autonomy that “capture[s] this reality.”51 These considerations lead him to think that 
nonalienation is the proper test for determining whether a person is autonomous because 
nonalienation doesn’t require that individuals identify whole-heartedly with their value 
commitment. Alienation, in the sense Christman intends, picks out a reaction to one’s 
value commitment in question. This reaction isn’t ambivalence or indifference but rather 
that one feels constrained by a value commitment and wants to reject it.52 Notice that 
Christman conceptualizes alienation as a necessary “combination of judgment and 
affective reaction.”53 This distinguishes Christman’s view in another way from standard 
accounts of proceduralism, which he claims are “overly cognitive...stressing the ability to 
make rational, detached, and calculative judgments about the acceptability of a trait.”54 
So, a person must critically reflect on her commitment but her judgment about its 
acceptability has an affective aspect to it. 
There are three other important aspects of Christman’s view of reflection besides 
the cognitive and affective components. First, as we have already noted above, reflection 
is counterfactual: an individual isn’t required to reflect in order be autonomous. Rather it 
must be true of her that if she did reflect on her value commitment she would endorse it. 
Second, it is piecemeal because an individual does not have to reflect upon all of her 
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value commitments, but rather only the commitment in question.55 Third, an individual’s 
analysis of the value commitment in light of its historical development is (in Christman’s 
terms) “fully subjective.”56 The appraisal, in other words, depends upon her own attitude 
toward the value commitment, rather than relying upon judgments or values that are 
independent of her perspective.  
What is important to notice about all of these conditions, however, is that they 
make no reference to “what is happening in the social environment.” Rather, the 
conditions for autonomy on a proceduralist view make reference only to an individual’s 
psychological processes and states. What this means is that proceduralists think that it is 
possible even for Jane to be autonomous, even though she lives within highly restrictive, 
traditional social arrangements, because autonomy from the perspective of proceduralism 
is not about adopting the “right” value commitments or living in the “right” social 
relations.57 Rather, autonomy is about engaging in the proper critical reflection and 
adopting the right sort of attitudes toward one’s value commitments.  
To be clear, however, Christman acknowledges that social conditions might 
interfere with the development or the exercise of a person’s capacity for autonomy.58 
Given this, Christman also places further constraints on the competency conditions for 
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autonomy, i.e. those related to the characteristics necessary for effective decision-making. 
Christman stipulates further that a person’s reflections cannot be “the product of social 
and psychological conditions that prevent adequate appraisal of oneself.”59 This means 
that one must be free from certain factors (e.g. blinding rage, drug or alcohol addiction, 
depression) and one must have the ability and the freedom to evaluate aspects of one’s 
personality and social conditions, which requires that one has “minimal education” and 
“exposure to alternatives.”60 Thus, if an agent is critically reflecting upon her value 
commitments, but she is under the psychological sway of a powerful cult leader, she 
would not count as autonomous on Christman’s account, even if she felt no alienation 
toward her commitments. Nevertheless, the inclusion of these constraints on the 
competency conditions for autonomy does not change the proceduralist theorist’s 
underlying assumption, namely that, in the final analysis, what establishes whether a 
person is autonomous is a function of her psychological states and not her social 
conditions. Proceduralist theorists such as Christman deny that social conditions are part 
of the defining conditions for autonomy, but acknowledge that social conditions can 
interfere with the development or exercise of a person’s autonomy. For proceduralists, 
then, social conditions play only a causal role in the debate over autonomy. 
Kymlicka and Proceduralism 
 In this section, I argue that the view of autonomy Kymlicka incorporates in his 
theory of liberalism is not a proceduralist view. To make my case, I begin by considering 
the following argument. At first glance, one might think that Kymlicka’s view of 
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autonomy is proceduralist because Kymlicka’s account and proceduralism share two 
important motivating assumptions. As we saw above, proceduralism is motivated by the 
intuition that a person’s values are valid for her only when she endorses them from her 
own perspective. This is why defenders of proceduralism maintain that any reasonable 
theory of autonomy should be content-neutral. Autonomy shouldn’t require that 
individuals endorse (or reject) particular values in order to be autonomous because 
individuals will not recognize the import of values deemed “right” by an external 
perspective. Along the same lines, at the heart of Kymlicka’s view of liberalism is the 
idea that each of us has an essential interest in leading a good life.61 But, as Kymlicka 
argues, I live a good life only when I am leading it on the basis of beliefs I identify as 
valuable. Liberal thinkers refer to this as the “endorsement constraint”: there is no way of 
living that is good for me unless I endorse it from my own perspective.62 This is why 
autonomy is crucial for Kymlicka’s formulation of liberalism because being autonomous 
helps individuals identify what is valuable.  
Kymlicka also recognizes, however, that it is possible for individuals to be 
mistaken about what is valuable and “no one wants to lead a life based on false beliefs.”63 
But, even if a person can be mistaken in this way, it does not follow that his life will go 
better if he is compelled to live his life according to values he doesn’t endorse. Rather, 
his life goes better only when he is “leading it from the inside, according to [his] beliefs 
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about value.”64 So, on Kymlicka’s view, individuals not only must have the critical and 
reflective capacities necessary to determine one’s values in order to be autonomous, they 
must also have the ability to rationally revise their beliefs about what is valuable.65 
According to Kymlicka, in order for a person to have this ability, he must have access to 
information about his options, as well as a minimal level of education to be able to think 
about his options in an intelligent and informed manner. On Kymlicka’s view, then, 
autonomy requires that individuals have the space to figure out whether their current 
values are the values they want to hold and to change their minds and pursue different 
values. So, I think it’s reasonable to say that Kymlicka shares the proceduralist intuition 
identified above: autonomy requires a wide space of noninterference in which individuals 
can identify and pursue their values. Nevertheless, even though both Kymlicka and the 
proceduralist accept the intuition that autonomy requires a wide space of noninterference, 
they disagree over how to cash out this intuition. Put another way, they differ over how to 
create this space.  
As we have seen, Christman argues that this wide space is created by making the 
conditions for autonomy as thin as possible. For Christman, this means excluding social 
conditions from the definition of autonomy. On Christman’s view, to impose normative 
restrictions on the kinds of social conditions in which autonomous individuals must live 
only serves to narrow the space of noninterference and thus may prevent some 
individuals from pursuing their good as they see fit. For example, if we say that a 
person’s social conditions cannot be characterized by relations of domination and 
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subordination in order for her to be autonomous, it is difficult for Jane to pursue her 
beliefs about the rightness of female subordination.  
In contrast, while Kymlicka seems to share to the intuition that autonomy requires 
a wide space of noninterference, he seems to think that excluding social conditions from 
the definition of autonomy will only serve to threaten this space. Put another way, I argue 
that Kymlicka rejects the idea that social conditions are only causally related to a theory 
of autonomy and instead thinks that social conditions are partly constitutive of autonomy. 
This means that if certain social conditions are missing from a person’s life, then that 
person does not qualify, by definition, as autonomous. To make my argument, I want to 
return briefly to Christman’s claim about the role of social conditions in autonomy. As 
we have seen, proceduralists think that social conditions can cause or impair the 
development of a person’s capacity for autonomy. Proceduralists have been particularly 
interested in the way in which oppressive social conditions can interfere with a person’s 
capacity for autonomy.66 But, proceduralists also suggest that it is both empirically and 
logically possible for a person to live in oppressive social conditions and be autonomous, 
provided she exercises (or can exercise) her capacity for autonomy in the proper way. 
This is why someone like Jane can count as autonomous on the proceduralist view. While 
we might question whether this understanding of the relation between oppression and 
autonomy is sound, I don’t consider this debate here.67 For our purposes, the take-home 
message with respect to proceduralism and oppressive social conditions is this. Because it 
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is both empirically and logically possible on the proceduralist view for a person to live in 
an oppressive social environment and be autonomous, this means that certain social 
conditions can be absent altogether. For example, the proceduralist view can allow that a 
person is both autonomous and at the same time denied certain rights and freedoms, 
provided she is not denied the opportunity to develop and exercise her capacity for 
critical reflection. However, I argue that Kymlicka rejects this view. 
To understand why, recall that, on Kymlicka’s view, leading a good life requires 
leading it from the inside on the basis of values one identifies as important and this 
requires that one is autonomous. To be autonomous, Kymlicka claims that “individuals 
must therefore have the resources and liberties needed to lead their lives in accordance 
with their beliefs about value, without fear of discrimination or punishment.”68 Because 
individuals must have these conditions to be autonomous, liberal states are required to 
uphold the individual’s right to privacy and remain neutral or refuse to promote a 
particular moral framework.69 In addition, Kymlicka argues that autonomy requires that 
individuals “be free to question those beliefs, to examine them in light of whatever 
information, examples, and arguments our culture can provide. Individuals must therefore 
have the conditions necessary to acquire an awareness of different views about the good 
life, and an ability to examine these views intelligently.”70 Because individuals must have 
these conditions to be autonomous, the liberal state must grant to individuals various 
rights and freedoms, such as freedom of association, conscience, and expression and 
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mandates a minimum level of education for all individuals, for these rights and freedoms 
make it possible for individuals to learn about other ways of living and value frameworks 
and to assess them critically. 
So what can we conclude about Kymlicka’s statements about what individuals 
“must” have to be autonomous? I suggest that they provide evidence that he rejects the 
idea that social conditions are only causally related to autonomy and instead thinks that 
they are partly constitutive of autonomy. Without these conditions in place, a person is 
not autonomous by definition on Kymlicka’s view. For example, I must have the right to 
privacy to be autonomous for without this right, I may be persecuted for holding 
unconventional beliefs. If I am fearful of persecution, I may not follow my preferred 
beliefs but rather hold whatever beliefs are deemed “proper.” But, if I am leading my life 
on the basis of beliefs that I do not regard as valuable, then I am not autonomous. Along 
the same lines, I must have freedom of conscience to be autonomous for without this 
right, I may be prevented from questioning my socially inherited beliefs. If I am not 
permitted to engage in this kind of questioning, I may be leading my life on the basis of 
beliefs I do not deem as valuable from my own perspective. If so, I am not leading my 
life from the inside, according to what I deem as valuable, and so I am not autonomous. If 
I’m not autonomous, then I am not leading a good life.  
However, we have seen that proceduralists maintain that individuals may qualify 
as autonomous in any kind of social environment, even one characterized by oppressive 
conditions. If so, then it must be the case on the proceduralist view that individuals can 
live in an environment without the various rights and freedoms Kymlicka discusses in his 




autonomous without these rights and freedoms, then the view of autonomy he 
incorporates in his view of liberalism cannot be proceduralist. 
Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, I have argued that the view of autonomy Kymlicka incorporates in 
his theory of liberalism cannot be proceduralist. This is because proceduralism denies 
that social conditions are part of the defining conditions of autonomy. In other words, the 
kinds of social conditions in which a person lives do not determine (or partly determine) 
whether she is autonomous. Only a person’s psychological states matter for determining a 
person’s autonomy. Proceduralist theorists claim that a person’s social conditions play 
only a causal role in the development of a person’s capacity for autonomy. However, as I 
have argued, Kymlicka denies that social conditions are only causally related to 
autonomy. Rather, I made the claim that Kymlicka maintains that social conditions are 
part of the defining conditions for autonomy and that they must obtain in order for a 
person to be autonomous. If I am right that Kymlicka views social conditions in this way, 
then he is not offering a proceduralist view in his liberalism. Instead, he is offering what 
autonomy theorists refer to as a substantive account of autonomy because it claims that 
social conditions are partly constitutive of autonomy. However, just as there are 
conceptual variations in theories of autonomy, there are different substantive views. In 




STRONG AND WEAK SUBSTANTIVE  
THEORIES OF AUTONOMY 
Introduction
 In the previous chapter, I concluded that Kymlicka’s view of liberalism does not 
incorporate a proceduralist view of autonomy. As I argued, Kymlicka’s account of 
autonomy claims that social conditions are part of the definition of autonomy, yet this is 
what proceduralist views deny. I claimed in the conclusion of Chapter 2 that because 
Kymlicka introduces social conditions as part of the defining conditions of autonomy, his 
view of autonomy must be substantive. However, as I noted previously, there are 
different interpretations of substantivist accounts of autonomy, so we need to establish 
which view Kymlicka employs in his theory of liberalism. In this chapter, I have two 
main goals. First, I elaborate on one important substantivist view in the literature: strong 
substantivism. I discuss this in more detail shortly, but for now: on this view, a person 
must engage in the proper critical reflection and her choices and preferences are subject 
to certain normative constraints. As we will see, Kymlicka’s view of autonomy is not a 
strong substantivist view, because it offers different substantive conditions for autonomy 
than those offered by the strong substantivist. However, my claim isn’t simply that these 
two views are dissimilar. Rather, I contend that strong substantivism is incompatible with 




constraint, which we considered in Chapter 2, holds that a person’s life doesn’t go better 
if it is led from the “outside,” according to beliefs he doesn’t endorse. Because Kymlicka 
regards the endorsement constraint as a fundamental feature of his liberalism, he cannot 
incorporate a theory of autonomy which infringes on this constraint.  
 My second aim in this chapter is to introduce another substantivist theory of 
autonomy, which theorists refer to as a weak substantive view. I elaborate in greater 
detail shortly, but for now we can note that such views claim that a person is autonomous 
if she critically reflects in the right way and she holds the right psychological attitudes 
toward herself. One might wonder why I’m not devoting a separate chapter to weak 
substantive views, given that I am doing so for the other main accounts of autonomy. 
However, my reasons for doing so will become clear when I develop my argument 
against weak substantivism. According to its defenders, weak substantive views are 
attractive because they seem to escape the problems raised by proceduralism and strong 
substantive views and thus provide a more reasonable account of autonomy than its 
rivals. Here, I argue that weak substantive theories fail to do this. I will argue that the 
weak substantivist view collapses into strong substantivism and so does not represent a 
viable alternative view of autonomy. If so, then Kymlicka’s account of autonomy in his 
liberalism cannot be a weak substantivist view, because weak substantivist views are 
merely strong substantivist views in disguise and I will have shown that Kymlicka’s view 
of autonomy cannot be strong substantivist.  
 All autonomy theorists grapple with what I shall call the “content” question: 
Should a theory of autonomy place direct restrictions on the content of an agent’s value 




kinds of restrictions would require autonomous individuals to make (or avoid making) 
certain choices or to hold (or avoid holding) certain preferences. As I noted above, strong 
substantivists answer “yes” to this question.  Proceduralists, however, answer “no” to the 
content question. As we noted in Chapter 2, proceduralists are guided by the intuition that 
a person’s values are valid for him only when he endorses them from his own 
perspective. If a theory of autonomy requires that individuals accept (or reject) a 
particular value, there is the possibility those individuals don’t regard that value as 
important from their own perspective. So, proceduralists think it is counterintuitive for a 
theory of autonomy to impose normative constraints on the content of an individual’s 
value commitments. In this chapter, I elaborate upon a second concern proceduralists 
raise with respect normative content in a theory of autonomy. According to Christman, a 
theory of autonomy which imposes normative restrictions on the content of individuals’ 
choices and preferences run the risk of justifying paternalistic intervention in their lives.  
On the face of it, it appears that proceduralist critics raise compelling concerns 
about placing such restrictions on the content of choices and preferences. Moreover, as 
we will see, other autonomy theorists who aren’t proceduralists also take issue with 
strong substantivism for imposing these restrictions. Indeed, all other views of autonomy 
– except for strong substantivism – maintain that it is inappropriate to place direct 
restrictions on the kinds of value commitments an autonomous individual can endorse. It 
appears, then, that strong substantivists face an uphill battle in defending the appeal of the 
view, given that most autonomy theorists reject its central claim. My first task is to 
elaborate strong substantivism in more detail, while also providing considerations in 




Strong Substantivism and Proceduralism on Oppressive Values 
 Why think that a theory of autonomy should place direct restrictions on the kinds 
of value commitments an autonomous agent can endorse? To make a case for this claim, 
it will be helpful to return to proceduralism, given that this view denies outright that a 
theory of autonomy should incorporate any normative restrictions on value commitments. 
This is why autonomy theorists refer to proceduralist views as content-neutral: they take 
no stand on the kinds of value commitments an autonomous agent must endorse. 
However, strong substantivist critics of proceduralism maintain that content-neutrality 
leads to counterintuitive implications.71 To understand what these implications are and 
why proceduralism leads to them, let’s turn to a divisive issue for autonomy theorists: 
agents who hold value commitments with oppressive content. These represent hard cases 
because it’s not clear whether acting on these commitments diminish a person’s 
autonomy and, if so, how. Can a person make choices on the basis of oppressive value 
commitments and be autonomous? To understand what I mean by oppressive value 
commitments, let’s return to the example of Jane in the previous chapter. Recall that Jane 
preferred to submit to her husband’s authority in all important matters on the grounds that 
her religious beliefs dictated this. While autonomy theorists would agree that Jane’s value 
commitment to subordination is oppressive because it deems Jane to be in a morally 
subordinate position, theorists disagree over whether it is possible for Jane to hold and act 
on her commitment and count as autonomous. I noted previously that proceduralists like 
Christman would deem Jane’s choice to be subordinate as autonomous, just in case she 
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exhibits (or would exhibit) reflective competence and holds (or would hold) the right 
psychological attitudes toward her preference, were she to reflect on that preference. On 
proceduralist views, the content of her commitment is irrelevant for establishing whether 
she is autonomous. Another so-called hard case for autonomy theorists is an agent who 
prefers not simply subordination, but slavery. Clearly, a commitment to slavery is 
oppressive because it regards some individuals not simply as morally inferior, but less 
than human. However, because proceduralists are committed to content-neutrality, they 
are committed to the view that even a slave can turn out to be autonomous, provided he 
is reflectively competent and would hold the right psychological attitudes toward his 
value commitment for slavery, were he to reflect upon it in the proper way. 
 However, because proceduralism makes room for the possibility of autonomous 
subordinated wives and (especially) autonomous slaves, strong substantivist critics regard 
the view as deeply counterintuitive. It’s important to be clear on where the 
counterintuitive implication arises for the strong substantivist. The issue here isn’t the 
historical process by which Jane or the slave arrived at their value commitments or the 
social environment in which they are embedded. Nor is the issue that Jane or the slave are 
incompetent reasoners or that the content of their value commitments prevents them from 
critically reflecting in the proper way. (Of course, this might be the case, but, for the 
strong substantivist, this is not why proceduralism leads to counterintuitive implications.) 
Rather, strong substantivists argue that proceduralism is counterintuitive because content-
neutrality seems to lead to a paradox. On the one hand, proceduralists hold that 
individuals are autonomous when they identify and make choices on the basis of 




proceduralists claim that this is their guiding intuition in formulating their theory of 
autonomy. On the other hand, because proceduralism upholds content-neutrality, it is a 
consequence of the view that autonomous individuals can prefer, and make choices on 
the basis of, subordination or slavery. But, these are ways of living in which an individual 
does not and cannot determine her preferences and values from her own point of view. 
How can a person be autonomous, i.e. decide her preferences and values from her own 
perspective, when others decide them for her?  
Given that proceduralism seems to result in a paradox, strong substantivist 
theorists suggest that our theorizing about autonomy should be guided by another 
intuition: that some ways of living are incompatible with autonomy and living as a 
subordinate wife or a slave seems to be paradigmatic examples of these ways of living. 
For strong substantivists, this incompatibility between autonomy and some ways of living 
arises because of the content of the value commitments that undergird these ways of 
living, and not because of how these commitments were formed, e.g. through oppressive 
socialization.72 If we are guided by this intuition, then, we are led to formulating a theory 
of autonomy which places normative restrictions on the content of an agent’s preferences 
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(or, put another way, it must reject content-neutrality). This move not only sidesteps the 
paradox that arises for proceduralist accounts, it also means that subordinate wives and 
slaves will never turn out to be autonomous on strong substantivist views. It is important 
to note, however, that the strong substantivist isn’t saying that the mere fact that a person 
holds preferences with the “wrong” content makes her nonautonomous. Rather, strong 
substantivists are claiming that if a person holds a preference for subordination and she 
acts on this preference, then she is not autonomous. Here’s why. According to defenders 
of the view, individuals who choose subservience or slavery make “a special kind of 
moral mistake.”73 For example, Jane’s moral error stems from the fact that she makes a 
choice which denies her standing as a moral equal. Strong substantivists say that the 
reason Jane makes this error is due to the content of Jane’s preference for subordination. 
The content prevents her psychology from “hooking up” or corresponding to an objective 
feature of the world, namely the fact that she is morally equal. A person is autonomous 
on the strong substantivist view if she critically reflects in the proper way and avoids 
holding the “wrong” preferences and making the “wrong” choices. If a person has the 
“right” preferences, this will ensure that her psychology is “hooking up” to the world in 
the proper way, and so will ensure that she makes the “right” kinds of choices, e.g. a non-
subordinate life.  
I’ve argued in the previous chapter that Kymlicka’s account of autonomy in his 
liberalism in not a proceduralist view. Here, I want to argue a strong substantivist view is 
incompatible with Kymlicka’s view. To make my case, let’s begin by considering the 
following line of thought. One might wonder: why can’t Kymlicka simply “add” a 
                                                 
73





normative restriction condition to the set of conditions he identifies as necessary for 
autonomy? After all, strong substantivism is attractive because it can explain a moral 
problem with oppression: it creates and upholds relations of domination and 
subordination between persons thus denying the equal moral standing of persons. Given 
that liberals like Kymlicka oppose these kinds of relations, perhaps liberals should adopt 
a strong substantivist view of autonomy.  To provide further support for this line of 
thought, recall Kymlicka’s own observations about the foundations of liberalism.  
On his view, each of us has an essential interest in leading a good life and it is this 
interest which forms the basis of liberal political theory. There is a difference, however, 
between leading a life that is good and leading a life that one believes to be good. For 
Kymlicka, it is possible that anyone can be mistaken about what the good life consists in 
and this possibility explains why each of us deliberates, even agonizes, over significant 
decisions.74 We deliberate because we know we are the kinds of beings prone to making 
errors in reasoning or we know we may come to regret our choices, even if everything 
goes according to our rationally decided plan. I may be successful at something, but it 
doesn’t follow that I have good reason to continue on this path or think it is a valuable 
way to live.75 Indeed, Kymlicka points out that we devote a good deal of time and 
concern ourselves with thinking about our projects and values and this “only makes sense 
on the assumption that our essential interest is in living a good life, not the life we 
currently believe to be good...it is important to us that we not lead our lives on the basis 
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of false beliefs.”76 Let’s put these thoughts together. There are some ways of living that 
are objectively better than others and each of us has an essential interest in leading an 
objectively good life. Because we can be mistaken about our good, this is why Kymlicka 
argues that it is necessary for us to be autonomous because being autonomous can help us 
to come to know what is valuable.77 As we have seen, Kymlicka claims that autonomy 
requires individuals to have 1) the ability to arrive at our beliefs through a process of 
rational reflection, 2) the ability to rationally revise our beliefs, should we decide they are 
no longer worthy of holding, and 3) the social conditions necessary for exercising these 
abilities. However, the question facing us is this: why can’t Kymlicka incorporate a 
fourth condition for autonomy, one which places restrictions on the value commitments 
individuals can endorse? After all, Kymlicka thinks that there are objectively good ways 
of living, so why not embrace a theory of autonomy which clearly specifies these ways of 
living (or, at least, specifies objectively bad ways of living to avoid)? Furthermore, as 
Kymlicka himself points out, people sometimes make mistakes about what is valuable, 
choosing conceptions of the good that are not in fact worthwhile. Why, then, can’t 
Kymlicka appeal to a theory of autonomy that precludes people from holding and acting 
upon the wrong preferences? If the ultimate goal is for individuals to lead good lives, 
then why not endorse a theory according to which people are autonomous only if they 
adopt the values and preferences that ensure they lead good lives? 
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It is my contention that Kymlicka cannot “add” a normative constraint condition 
to his current theory of autonomy. Here’s why. Kymlicka thinks that being autonomous 
and embracing objectively good values are both necessary for leading a life that is good, 
but they are not sufficient. For Kymlicka, there is yet another necessary condition for 
leading a good life: that one leads it from the inside, according to beliefs and preferences 
one deems important from one’s own subjective perspective. As we noted above, 
Kymlicka refers to this as the endorsement constraint and enshrines it as a fundamental 
feature of his liberalism.78 According to this constraint, a person’s life goes well only if 
he leads it from the inside.79 Conversely, a person’s life doesn’t go better if he leads it 
from the outside, according to values he doesn’t endorse or regard as important from his 
own perspective. Kymlicka accepts the endorsement constraint on the grounds that it is 
self-defeating to force people to hold or reject certain preferences or beliefs in order that 
they lead a good life. Consider Kymlicka’s own example.80 Even if it is true that going to 
church is a valuable activity, we do not help individuals to lead objectively good lives by 
compelling them to go to church. This is because individuals who are forced to go to 
church will fail to see the good in going to church for themselves; as such, the activity of 
going to church will have no meaning for them and their lives won’t go better.81  People 
must identify their own reasons for endorsing a preference or belief; other people cannot 
supply that reason for them. As Kymlicka points out, “value rarely comes in form that 
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can be injected into a person.”82 Margaret Moore elaborates on this idea in the following 
way:  
Objective values, such as love or friendship or beauty, cannot merely be 
dispensed to people, X units for each person: the person must feel love or 
affection to realize the objective value of a fulfilling relationship or appreciate art 
to realize the objective value of beauty...it is important that the person feel a 
subjective commitment to these values in order to live a good life.83 
 
So, if Kymlicka is committed to the endorsement constraint, why does this mean he 
cannot add a normative constraint condition? The normative constraint condition says, 
“Here are the kinds of preferences and beliefs people must avoid holding in order to 
qualify as autonomous, regardless of whether they see the value or disvalue in these 
preferences and beliefs for themselves.” In other words, by identifying the “wrong” 
preferences, the normative constraint condition in effect “dispenses” preferences and 
beliefs to people. But, on Kymlicka’s view, if people have their values “dispensed” to 
them from an external perspective, i.e. the normative constraint condition, then they are 
leading their lives from the “outside.” If people are leading their lives from the outside, 
they are not leading them from the inside, according to values they deem important from 
their own perspective. If people are not leading their lives from the inside, they are not 
living lives that are good. This is because leading one’s life from the inside is a necessary 
condition for leading a life that is good. So, this is why Kymlicka cannot add a normative 
constraint condition to his current theory of autonomy: it is incompatible with a key 
feature of his liberalism, i.e. the endorsement constraint. A normative constraint 
condition “dispenses” values to people, but Kymlicka denies that individuals lead lives 
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that are good if they have values “dispensed” to them. If the normative constraint 
condition is incompatible with the endorsement constraint, Kymlicka cannot add this 
condition to his current theory of autonomy. As such, Kymlicka’s view of autonomy 
cannot be strong substantivist. 
Weak Substantive Autonomy
Recently, some autonomy theorists have argued for what they refer to as a weak 
substantive view of autonomy. This view is situated between strong substantivism and 
proceduralism. Like proceduralists, weak substantivists claim that a person must critically 
reflect in the proper way in order to count as autonomous. I’ll say more shortly about 
why weak substantivist theorists think a reasonable account of autonomy must go beyond 
proceduralist standards.  But, for now, let’s note that defenders of weak substantivism 
claim further that a necessary condition of autonomy is that an autonomous agent holds 
the right kind self-regarding attitudes toward herself, e.g. a sense of self-worth as an 
agent.84 Having the right kind of attitudes ensures that an agent critically reflects in the 
right way, for these attitudes ensure that an agent is capable of identifying the reasons for 
her actions.85 Notice, however, that weak substantivist theorists are not saying that these 
attitudes are causally necessary for autonomy; rather, they are claiming that a defining 
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feature of autonomy is that an agent has a sense of self-worth. If a person lacks this 
attitude, then she is not autonomous, no matter how carefully she has critically reflected. 
So, like strong substantivism, weak substantivism claims there are external conditions 
(that is, conditions beyond an agent’s psychology) that must obtain in order for a person 
to count as autonomous (in this case, these conditions refer to facts about an agent’s 
competence.) But, unlike strong substantivism, weak substantivism doesn’t place direct 
restrictions on the content of an agent’s value commitments. This means that individuals 
can, in principle, endorse beliefs with any content, including hierarchical or oppressive 
value commitments like Jane’s, provided they are competent reasoners and exhibit the 
right kinds of self-regarding attitudes.  
So, to the “content” question, weak substantivist theorists would answer “no, 
but...” According to its defenders, weak substantive accounts are attractive for the 
following reasons. On the one hand, these views allow for greater leeway than strong 
substantive accounts with respect to the kinds of value commitments an autonomous 
agent can endorse, including hierarchical or oppressive value commitments. This is 
important because some individuals genuinely hold such values because while many of 
us may think such value commitments are morally problematic, weak substantive 
theorists share with proceduralists the intuition that autonomy requires a large space of 
noninterference. Individuals must have the practical and theoretical space to identify and 
pursue their good, even according to values others might regard as morally wrong or 
repugnant.  
On the other hand, defenders claim that weak substantive accounts are preferable 




another way, defenders deny that an account of autonomy that incorporates purely 
proceduralist standards is sufficient. To understand why, it will be helpful at this point to 
introduce another standard objection against proceduralism. As we have seen, because 
such views maintain that reflective competence and the right kind of psychological 
attitudes are necessary and sufficient for autonomy, there is the possibility that deferential 
wives and slaves will turn out to be autonomous. This strikes some critics as deeply 
problematic, but the issue in this case is not the content of the preferences. (Recall that 
this is a concern for strong substantivists, but not for weak substantivist theorists.) The 
worry here is that it seems reasonable to think that oppressive socialization interferes 
with a person’s capacity for autonomy, so it seems counterintuitive to say that Jane or the 
slave is autonomous. To be clear, the point here isn’t that Jane’s social training renders 
her incapable of critical reasoning. Rather, the concern is that Jane has been socially 
trained not only to value, but to want to value, subordination. Because Jane’s social 
training has led her to internalize so deeply ideas about the “rightness” of female 
subordination, her critical endorsement of her values as “her own” may not be indicative 
of her autonomy as proceduralists claim. In other words, critics have doubts that 
proceduralist standards alone picks out autonomous agents.  
Procedural theorists acknowledge that it is possible for certain factors to interfere 
with a person’s critical faculties, such as one’s social training, hypnosis, brainwashing, or 
manipulation by evil neuroscientists, in which case a person would not count as 
autonomous.86 But, procedural theorists also maintain that it is possible social training 
will not interfere with a person’s reflective capacities, even if she has been socialized to 
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value subordination. We can’t assume that a person who wants to choose according to 
subordinate value commitments has compromised critical capacities as a result of her 
social training. Furthermore, because it is possible for a person to genuinely prefer 
subordination, a reasonable view of autonomy will make conceptual room for this 
possibility by positing only minimal standards for autonomy. What is important, then, is 
to identify an account of critical reflection fine-grained enough to pick out an agent 
whom it is reasonable to think endorses hierarchical value commitments as her “own” 
and yet can provide an effective filter to isolate agents who hold similar commitments but 
of whom it is reasonable to think does not hold those commitments as her own.   
In response, critics might say the following to the procedural theorist: “You can 
refine the critical reflective process and introduce further constraints on the process to 
make it as fine-grained as you wish. But, this move does not address the worry that critics 
raise. The problem isn’t that proceduralists have yet to identify the right critical reflection 
procedure; rather, the problem is that because the proceduralist standards as such are so 
minimal, there are people who meet them that seem, in an obvious, intuitive way to not 
be autonomous (e.g. they defer to their husbands in all decisions). For example, consider 
on Christman’s view that a person must critically reflect in the right way on her value 
commitments and she must not feel a sense of alienation toward them. Suppose that Jane 
reflects carefully and thoughtfully upon the historical processes by which her value 
commitment to subordination arose. Suppose further that she would not resist these 
processes, even if someone tells her that she has been socially trained to hold value 
commitments that maintain oppressive relations of domination and subordination 




commitment to subordination, she would likely think, “I should be subject to the kind of 
social training that led me to have this value commitment. This is the way things should 
be. So, I wouldn’t resist the processes by which my commitment to subordination arose 
and I don’t feel alienated toward it.” Because Jane has been trained to want to value 
subordination and accept the “rightness” of gender hierarchy, it is unlikely she would 
resist the historical process or that she would feel a sense of alienation toward her 
commitment. So, critics conclude, we can’t be sure whether Jane’s critical reflections 
secure her autonomy or whether she is simply reiterating the terms of her subordination. 
According to defenders of weak substantivism, however, the introduction of self-
regarding attitudes as necessary for autonomy gets around this problem raised by 
proceduralist views. On the one hand, weak substantivist theorists agree with 
proceduralists that we need to make room for the possibility of agents who endorse 
hierarchical or subordinate value commitments and also qualify as autonomous. But, in 
order to be satisfied that such agents are actually autonomous with respect to those 
commitments, we need to introduce conditions for autonomy beyond an agent’s internal 
psychological states. A person has to have the right self-regarding attitude toward herself, 
which of course is a psychological state, but it is an objective feature of the world that she 
actually has this attitude. According to weak substantivists, the introduction of self-
regarding attitudes provides an effective way to filter out agents who endorse hierarchical 
beliefs from agents whose endorsement of the same kinds of beliefs may not be genuine. 




worthy of being “the author of her own conduct,”87 then she is autonomous (provided she 
meets the further reflective competence condition as well.) 
Weak Substantive Autonomy: A New Way? 
While proponents are confident that weak substantive views represent the way 
forward beyond the impasse between procedural and strong substantive views over the 
“content” question, I am less certain. Here is my strategy in this section. To make my 
arguments against weak substantivism, I consider two of the so-called “hard cases” for 
autonomy. We’ve already discussed Jane and her choice to subordinate herself to male 
authority for religious reasons. Another kind of hard case is one in which a woman 
chooses to engage in (what can be construed as) a practice of gender oppression. For 
example, suppose Fatima chooses to wear a full face and body veil for (what she claims 
to be) religious reasons and as a marker of social and cultural identity. However, the 
Islamic practice of veiling has traditionally been (and perhaps continues to be) employed 
to control female sexuality. So, choosing to wear a veil is a hard case for autonomy 
theorists because an individual makes a choice on the basis of values linked to gender 
oppression and it seems reasonable to think that oppressive values have the potential to 
impair a person’s capacity for autonomy (even if it’s not clear how this impairment 
happens.)88 However, even if we grant that this is an oppressive practice, some autonomy 
theorists insist that we cannot conclude that choosing to engage in these practices 
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diminishes a person’s autonomy.89  
As we have seen, proceduralists would say that Jane is (or would be) autonomous 
provided she is (or would be) reflectively competent and has (or could have) the right 
psychological attitudes, e.g. nonalienation, and I think they would make similar 
evaluations about Fatima, provided that she would meet the conditions for autonomy. In 
contrast, strong substantivist theorists deny that agents who hold the “wrong” preference 
or make the “wrong” choices cannot be autonomous, even if they are reflectively 
competent. Furthermore, I take it that strong substantivist theorists would regard Jane’s 
preference to submit to male authority and Fatima’s preference to wear a full veil as the 
“wrong” kinds of preferences. They are the “wrong” kind of preferences because their 
content leads Jane and Fatima to make a serious moral error: they fail to regard and treat 
themselves as full moral equals. Put another way, the content of their preferences 
prevents their psychologies from “hooking up” with or corresponding to an objective 
feature about the world, i.e. that they are moral equals.  Because they make this kind of 
moral error, strong substantivists would deem Jane and Fatima as nonautonomous.  
Let’s turn now to considering weak substantivism, because (as I have noted 
above) defenders of the view see themselves as staking a path between proceduralism and 
strong substantivism. However, it is my contention that weak substantivist views fail to 
provide a “third” way between proceduralist and strong substantivist views. First, I will 
argue that weak substantive standards fail to provide an effective filter to pick out those 
agents who genuinely hold hierarchical beliefs from agents whose support of the same 
kinds of beliefs may not be genuine. As such, weak substantivism is subject to the same 
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objection raised against proceduralism. Second, I will argue that weak substantivist 
standards must incorporate stronger normative substance in order to avoid this objection. 
But, I will show that this runs the risk of collapsing weak substantive views into strong 
substantivism. For, once we ramp up weak substantivist requirements, these views and 
strong substantive views will assess the very same cases as either autonomous or 
nonautonomous. If my argument is right, this suggests that weak substantive views aren’t 
doing what they are supposed to do, namely making room for a wider range of value 
commitments that agents can endorse, and still qualify as autonomous, including 
hierarchical beliefs. If so, we have no reason to prefer weak substantive views over strong 
substantive views. 
To begin to make my case, I appeal to Paul Benson’s weak substantive account.90 
On his account, a person is autonomous when she has proper regard for her authority as 
an agent. He states that, “occupying a position of authority to speak for one’s intentions 
and acts seems to depend not only on one’s objective fitness to play the role of potential 
answerer, but also on one’s regard for one’s abilities and social position.”91 I’ll consider 
the latter condition first.  
For a person to have regard for her abilities and social position, she must hold the 
right kinds of attitudes toward her “competence and worth through which [she] claim[s] 
such authority.”92 Benson explains this requires individuals to have “no serious doubts 
about their competence to recognize or construct reasons for their actions or about their 
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authority to speak and answer for their conduct, should others criticize it.”93 Moreover, 
individuals must not have “attitudes [which] manifest marked disengagement or 
dissociation from their conduct.”94 Positively, individuals must hold “reflexive attitudes 
toward their own agency [which] indicate that they really do take agential ownership of 
their decisions” and must “treat themselves as fit and worthy to identify adequate grounds 
for their decisions, to translate those decisions appropriately into conduct, and to answer 
for themselves should others challenge their reasons.”95 In other words, autonomous 
individuals are those who can offer to others reasons for their actions, which reasons-
giving reflects their attitude toward their competence and worth as moral agents. Notice, 
then, on Benson’s weak substantive view, normative authority doesn’t obtain when an 
agent endorses her value commitments or determines whether or not she feels alienated 
toward them, but rather, when she authorizes her agency.96 Individuals, therefore, lack 
autonomy because they fail to have the right self-regarding attitudes toward themselves 
as competent and worthy and so they regard themselves as unworthy to offer reasons for 
their conduct. To illustrate his point, Benson appeals to Ralph Ellison’s novel The 
Invisible Man, in which the narrator has internalized his “social invisibility” as an 
African-American man in the Jim Crow era. The protagonist cannot answer for his 
actions not only because his social conditions prevent him from occupying a position of 
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agential authority, he is unable to regard himself as a competent agent due to 
internalizing his invisibility.97  
Let’s now consider the first condition Benson identifies, namely that occupying a 
position of agential authority depends upon one’s “objective fitness” to fulfil that role. 
Here, I take Benson to mean that whether one is capable of fulfilling the role of answerer 
depends not on whether a person thinks she is competent but rather on whether she really 
is competent. So, whether one can take ownership of one’s actions partly depends upon 
external features of the world, so it is a social or relational condition for autonomy.98 
According to Benson, “to have the authority of owning one’s actions is to stand in a 
certain position with respect to others’ potential expectations for one’s conduct.”99 A 
person occupies a position of ownership over her actions, relative to those around her, 
because she is able to offer to others reasons for her actions, especially in the face of 
criticism. From Benson’s perspective, the introduction of a social dimension for 
autonomy serves to distinguish weak substantive views from proceduralist views. 
Certainly, proceduralist views may point to certain social factors as causally related to 
autonomy, such as having the kind of education that enables a person to hone her critical 
reflection skills. But, as we have seen, proceduralists deny that social factors explain why 
a person is autonomous; what matters for autonomy on their views is that a person meets 
the right psychological standards. In contrast, Benson’s weak substantivism holds that a 
person’s social relations are partly constitutive of her agential authority. That is, part of 
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what it is to have agential authority (and thus be autonomous) is to stand in social 
relations which allow a person to speak for her actions. 
Right away, we can see that the introduction of this social element prevents slaves 
from counting as autonomous on Benson’s account. After all, part of being a slave 
involves “social death” in which he or she is not recognized as fully human. Slaves 
cannot have agential authority because they cannot occupy a social position in which to 
speak for their actions. What about Jane and Fatima? Would they count as autonomous 
on weakly substantive views? The answer, of course, depends upon whether they are able 
to “take ownership” of their actions and authorize their agency and it seems reasonable to 
think they are able to do so. But, I want to argue here that the weak substantivist standard 
of taking ownership doesn’t provide a more effective filter than the proceduralist standard 
of critical reflection and endorsement. If I am right, then weak substantive views are 
subject to the same objection as proceduralist views.   
To see what I mean, let’s return to the example of Fatima. Let’s suppose that 
Fatima is proud of her religious and cultural heritage and identifies deeply with her 
religious faith as an integral part of her identity, and these reasons play a partial role in 
explaining her choice to wear a full veil. But, suppose further that she was raised to 
accept strict and conservative Islamic beliefs, some of which include beliefs about the 
inherent danger of female sexuality and the importance of female chastity to family 
“honor.” I agree with Benson that even if Fatima has been socially trained to accept these 
latter kinds of beliefs about female sexuality, this certainly doesn’t prevent her from 
having “some degree of self-awareness and access to relevant information that precludes 




control.”100 Even if women have been subject to oppressive socialization, this doesn’t 
render them incapable of reasoning or being aware of some of the limitations imposed by 
these beliefs.101 It seems easy to imagine Fatima confidently offering to us a coherent set 
of reasons for her choice to wear a full face and body veil on the basis of her beliefs. In 
fact, if a person couldn’t identify any reasons, we might wonder if he or she is an agent in 
the first place.102 The worry, however, is similar to the worry raised for proceduralist 
views: given that Fatima has been socialized to internalize her beliefs about her standing, 
why think her self-professed reasons for acting are her own, rather than reiterating the 
reasons dictated by those internalized beliefs?103 To be a reasons-giver and to regard 
oneself as such is compatible with nonautonomy because a person who has deeply 
internalized oppressive value commitments is still able to give reasons for her actions and 
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view herself as a competent reasons-giver. The problem is that the process of reasons-
giving doesn’t reveal whether they are an agent’s own reasons or whether she is reciting 
the terms of her subordination. If this is correct, then it seems that the self-regarding 
attitude of having a sense of one’s agential authority (as conceptualized by Benson) isn’t 
doing the work it should be doing. Individuals who we intuitively think are 
nonautonomous can meet the weak substantivist’s criteria for autonomy. As such, weak 
substantive standards (as presented by Benson) remain too weak to filter out agents who 
endorse hierarchical beliefs from agents whose endorsement of the same kinds of beliefs 
may not be genuine. 
Is there a way for the weak substantivist to get around this objection? Put 
differently, can the weak substantivist theorist offer standards for autonomy which are 1) 
strong enough to provide an effective filter and yet 2) not so strong as to introduce direct 
constraints on the content of an agent’s value commitments? To navigate through these 
constraints, I argue that Benson must move beyond standards related to reasons-giving 
because these aren’t normatively robust enough to sidestep the objection. While Benson 
maintains that an agent must be situated in social relations that allow her to give reasons 
for her actions and must regard herself as a reasons-giver, these conditions focus mainly 
on the ability to give reasons. I think these are necessary aspects to having a sense of 
one’s agential authority, but these are not sufficient. I argue that having authority in this 
sense also involves recognizing the value and importance of one’s capacity for reasons-
giving and to be prepared to take steps to develop, use, and maintain this capacity. I want 
to suggest that this capacity is like a muscle: it must first be developed in order to work 




effective. To accomplish this, a person must not put herself (or allow others to put her) in 
situations in which this capacity may atrophy. If a person has a sense of her agential 
authority, she wants to protect her capacity for reasons-giving because this is what makes 
her agential authority possible in the first place. Part of protecting this capacity involves 
expecting treatment (whether from oneself or from others) that is favorable to its 
development and functioning and objecting to treatment unfavorable to this end. So, on 
this revised agential authority condition, a person has a sense of her worth as an agent if 
she is capable of giving reasons to others to answer for her conduct, and is ready and able 
to protect and preserve her capacity for reasons-giving.  
Do these revised standards solve the problem raised initially for proceduralist and 
then weak substantivist views of autonomy? I think the answer is “yes”: if a person had a 
sense of her authority as an agent in the way I describe above, then this would secure her 
autonomy. We would not question whether she has “taken ownership” of her actions. 
However, if I am right that a defender of weak substantivism must strengthen the 
standards for autonomy in this way, then this places the view in a precarious position for 
the following reason. A person who has this kind of agential authority will not – as a 
matter of fact – choose to be subordinate or to accept the view that her worth as an agent 
depends upon her sexual conduct, all things equal. Subordination places a person in a 
situation in which her capacity for reasons-giving is compromised because she does not 
(and perhaps cannot) have reason to develop this capacity. Along the same lines, if one 
accepts the view that one’s worth depends upon whether one adheres to certain norms of 
sexual conduct, then one also implicitly accepts the view that one’s capacity for reasons-




seems reasonable to think that a person will spend less time and effort to developing and 
protecting her capacity for reasons-giving and devote more time to measuring up to these 
norms of sexual conduct. As such, Fatima and Jane make will turn out to be 
nonautonomous on the revised weak substantive view because their choices suggest they 
lack the right kind of agential authority necessary for autonomy. This is because their 
choices fail to protect and preserve their capacity for reasons-giving.  
Let’s put all of these thoughts together. I have argued that the weak substantivist 
theorist must revise his standards for autonomy, so that having a sense of one’s authority 
as an agent also involves having a desire to protect one’s capacity for reasons-giving, in 
addition to regarding and having others regard oneself as a competent reasons-giver. If a 
person has sense of her authority as an agent, I have argued that she will not, as a matter 
of fact, make choices which may compromise her capacity for reasons-giving. Put 
another way, I am arguing that having this sense of agential authority will rule out certain 
choices and preferences, i.e. those relating to subordination or practices of gender 
oppression. However, as we have seen, strong substantivist views also rule out these 
kinds of choices and preferences (though, admittedly, on different grounds). If I am right 
that weak substantive views rule out the very same cases as strong substantive accounts, 
then we have no reason to prefer the former to the latter.  
A weak substantive theorist might object along the following lines. Even if it is 
the case that weak substantive theories and strong substantive views rule out certain value 
commitments as being able to motivate autonomous choices, we still ought to prefer the 
former. This is because of the reason that weak substantive views rule out these 




autonomous is due to her lack of proper regard for herself as an agent and not because of 
the content of her value commitments. Weak substantive views do not take on the dicey 
(and potentially offending) task of judging the compatibility of the content of other 
agents’ value commitments with their ability to be autonomous. 
 But, whatever the reason that certain value commitments are ruled out, the point 
is that agents cannot make choices on the basis of these commitments and qualify as 
autonomous. Of course, a strong substantive theorist is not likely to lament this outcome. 
But, a weak substantive theorist will. According to proponents, weak substantive views 
are attractive because they do what proceduralism and strong substantivism cannot: 
provide standards for autonomy which clearly pick out agents who endorse hierarchical 
beliefs from agents whose endorsement of the same kinds of beliefs may not be genuine, 
while also providing the theoretical and practical space for agents to endorse a wide range 
of value commitments, including those with hierarchal content, and qualify as 
autonomous. Appealing, then, to a weak substantive theory of autonomy has failed to 
make practical and theoretical room for judging as autonomous some individuals who 
endorse value commitments based upon hierarchy. As a result, we have no reason to 
prefer weak substantive theories because they do not represent a meaningfully distinct 
theory of autonomy, relative to strong substantive accounts. If this is correct, then 
Kymlicka’s view of autonomy cannot be weak substantivist because such views collapse 
into strong substantivist views, and I have argued that Kymlicka’s account is not and 





While strong substantivist views autonomy uphold a widely accepted intuition 
that autonomous living is inconsistent with living subordinate to another, I have argued 
that Kymlicka’s cannot incorporate a normative constraint condition to his current theory 
of autonomy because it is incompatible with the endorsement constraint. In addition, I 
have argued that weak substantive standards for autonomy must incorporate normative 
substance beyond reasons-giving, in order to get around the objection raised for 
proceduralism. However, this move collapses weak substantivism into strong 
substantivism, thereby diminishing the appeal of such views. Furthermore, because I have 
argued that Kymlicka’s view cannot be strong substantivist, then his view cannot be weak 
substantivist either, given that there is a distinction without a difference between the two 
views. So, what is left in terms of theories of autonomy if Kymlicka’s view isn’t 
proceduralist, strong substantivist, or weak substantivist? There is another major view in 
the literature, namely socio-relational autonomy. In the next chapter, I elaborate on this 





KYMLICKA AND SOCIO-RELATIONAL AUTONOMY 
Introduction
As I pointed out in the introductory chapter, Kymlicka’s view of autonomy is one 
of the following kinds of theories of autonomy because these exhaust the kinds of views 
in the literature: proceduralist, strong substantivist, weak substantivist, or socio-
relational. In Chapters 2 and 3, I have argued Kymlicka’s view of autonomy is not 
proceduralist nor strong substantivist nor weak substantivist. Therefore, Kymlicka’s view 
of autonomy is socio-relational. According to the rough characterization I have been 
working with, socio-relational accounts of autonomy claim that both procedural and 
substantive standards must obtain for a person to count as autonomous. Immediately, this 
seems to raise two important questions about the soundness of my view. One might put 
the first question this way: if Kymlicka’s view of autonomy is not procedural and is not 
strong substantive, does it make sense to say that his view incorporates both kinds of 
standards?  
The second issue for my claim that Kymlicka’s view of autonomy is a socio-
relational view is this. Because it introduces standards with normative content as 
necessary for autonomy, this seems to stand in deep tension with another fundamental 
aspect of Kymlicka’s liberalism: his commitment to neutrality or antiperfectionism. 




between citizens’ ways of living when it incorporates a view of autonomy with standards 
that make direct reference to the kinds of social conditions in which citizens live? 
As we shall see in this chapter and the next, both of these potential worries are 
unfounded. My first task in this chapter is to elaborate on socio-relational autonomy, in 
particular by drawing attention to the ways in which this view of autonomy differs from – 
and avoids the criticisms of – the other leading theories of autonomy I have considered in 
this project. In this project, I appeal to Marina Oshana’s account of socio-relational 
autonomy, because I consider it the most sophisticated in the literature. However, as I 
will show, one aspect of Oshana’s view – namely the rejection of content-neutrality – 
raises several serious objections. Nevertheless, I argue that Oshana can revise her view to 
incorporate content-neutrality in order to meet these objections and thus render socio-
relational autonomy more attractive. Furthermore, I will show that this revision of a 
socio-relational account is necessary in order to defend my claim that Kymlicka’s view of 
autonomy is a socio-relational account.  In making these arguments, I’m also laying the 
groundwork for Chapter 5, where I discuss the liberal ideal of neutrality. There, I argue 
that Kymlicka can consistently maintain his commitment to neutrality and endorse a 
socio-relational account of autonomy.  
Socio-Relational Autonomy 
Since the 1980s, a number of theorists working on autonomy have argued that we 
need to rethink the nature of autonomy. Historically, proceduralism has been the most 
widely-accepted view of autonomy among theorists, even if they have disagreed over the 
precise standards necessary for autonomy. However, as we have seen, because such 




theorists have suggested that autonomy is more than simply a psychological concept in 
the way that proceduralist views describe. According to critics, then, procedural standards 
are necessary, but not sufficient, for autonomy. 
Some autonomy theorists have argued that a more reasonable account of 
autonomy should incorporate both procedural standards and normatively substantive 
standards, in order to avoid the issues that arise for strictly procedural views.  However, 
as we have discussed in Chapter 3, to identify the proper substantive standards for 
autonomy in no easy task for theorists. Strong substantivist theories of autonomy 
encounter significant problems when they claim that individuals must reject value 
commitments with particular content in order to count as autonomous. One possible way 
to defend strong substantive accounts is to try and identify a reasonable value 
commitment or commitments which all agents share (or could share) in order to qualify 
as autonomous. However, another way is to sidestep this kind of approach altogether and 
consider another method to incorporating normative substance into a theory of autonomy. 
This is the approach taken by Oshana.  
According to Oshana, we should prefer a socio-relational view of autonomy, not 
only because it avoids the problems that plague the other two leading views, but also 
because it provides an account more in harmony with our “considered intuitions about 
personal autonomy.”104 Autonomy on a socio-relational view isn’t primarily about the 
kind of critical reflection a person engages in or her psychological states. Nor is 
autonomy about avoiding the “wrong” kinds of value commitments. On a socio-relational 
account, autonomy is a global (as opposed to local) property of persons and it is a status 
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marker of people situated in social and political contexts who exercise a particular kind of 
authority over their lives. When we say that a person is socio-relationally autonomous, 
we are not simply identifying one particular instance in which a person meets the 
necessary conditions for autonomy. Rather, to say that a person is globally autonomous 
on this view is to say that she has “de facto power and authority over choices and actions 
significant to the direction of her life.”105 In particular, a person must be able to exercise 
real power and authority over her interpersonal relationships, social roles and relations, 
psychological states and processes, education, career path, health care, and belief 
systems. By real power, Oshana means that a person is not subject to interference by 
other agents, whether by coercion or manipulation, nor subject to “internal” interference, 
whether by weakness of will or psychological impairments.106 To exercise real power 
over one’s life, a person must have self-control, although this isn’t to suggest that a 
person must live her life stoically, and refrain from exhibit one’s emotions. On Oshana’s 
view, this means that a person acts in her own interests, rather than “succumbing to 
impulsive behavior” and that she has a “robust capacity” to act in this way, even if 
confronted with temptation.107 By real authority, Oshana means that a person not only 
possesses a de jure right or “moral right to control [her] own choices, actions, and goals,” 
she has the institutional status to protect her right to genuinely exercise this control, free 
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from the domination of others.108 Autonomy, then, is a condition or state, not simply the 
possession of a capacity or the ability to exercise it.109 
According to Oshana, viewing autonomy as a socio-relational concept requires us 
to conceive of autonomy as a “naturalized phenomenon.”110 Autonomy is a natural 
property of individuals and we determine whether a person is autonomous in large part by 
empirical observation.111 Autonomy is not simply a psychological phenomenon nor is it 
solely a judgment about a person’s psychological states. Rather, a judgment about 
autonomy is a “judgment about how that person is in the world.”112 Notice, then, by 
conceptualizing autonomy as naturalized, socio-relational autonomy avoids one of the 
major problems raised for proceduralism. Recall that critics faulted proceduralist 
standards as not fine-grained enough to pick out agents who we would intuitively judge 
as nonautonomous, e.g. the case of Jane. As critics of proceduralism point out, we must 
rely on Jane’s own subjective reports of her critical reflections to determine whether she 
is autonomous, even though we have doubts about whether her critical capacities are 
damaged by oppressive socialization. But, because socio-relational views understand 
autonomy as primarily an empirical matter, which depends upon the kinds of social 
relations a person lives in, it should be easier to determine whether a person is 
autonomous and thus there should be far fewer ambiguous cases.  
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Building on this line of thought, a naturalized account of autonomy recognizes 
that individuals are socially embedded within social and political frameworks, but 
maintains that to be autonomous, individuals must be free from “external interferences.” 
Certainly, Oshana isn’t suggesting here that individuals are autonomous because they 
have escaped the forces of socialization or because they are rugged individualists or 
iconoclasts. External interferences are different from external influences – the latter are 
compatible with autonomy. Oshana is arguing that certain external social factors can 
interfere with a person’s autonomy and we can determine what these are only by 
empirical observation. A naturalized view of autonomy, then, regards “autonomy as, in 
part, a function of a person’s [social] status and relations that are extrinsic to facts about 
her psychological history and occurrent psychological state.”113 In fact, Oshana argues 
that autonomy is primarily a social phenomenon, relative to the facts that obtain about a 
person’s social conditions, and secondarily a psychological phenomenon, relative to the 
facts about a person’s psychology. Clearly, to locate autonomy mainly in a person’s 
social conditions, and not solely in her psychological states, is a significant departure 
from proceduralist views of autonomy. So, at this point, I think it would be helpful to 
introduce Oshana’s general objections to proceduralist views of autonomy, in order to 
understand her motivation in conceptualizing autonomy along socio-relational lines. 
Oshana and Proceduralism
 According to Oshana, there is a psychological component to her account of 
autonomy and I discuss the standards she incorporates in greater detail in the next 
section. For now, we can note that Oshana argues that the following psychological 
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conditions are necessary for autonomy: epistemic competence; rationality; procedural 
independence; self-respect; and control. So, having the right psychological states is 
important on a socio-relational view, but Oshana argues that these states don’t tell us (as 
proceduralists insist) the whole story about a person’s autonomy. Oshana considers and 
rejects proceduralist theories as inadequate for the following reasons.114  
First, Oshana points out that proceduralist views “are disproportionately focused 
upon the mental status of the person and that such accounts are largely subjective.”115 
Oshana argues that the problem with proceduralism is that the test for satisfaction of the 
conditions for autonomy is fully exhausted by psychological phenomena. Oshana puts the 
point like this: “on proceduralist views, other people can measure a person’s autonomy 
given a shared measurement tool, but what the tool measures is internal to the 
individual.”116 So, this means that, on proceduralist views, the agent alone is “‘the 
measure of [her] own autonomy.’”117 But, as Oshana says, “this is plainly false.”118 A 
person may feel autonomous on the basis of her psychological states, but this feeling is 
qualia and “qualia alone do not decide the fact of autonomy any more than a feeling of 
oneself as nonautonomous decides against autonomy (perhaps no more, even, than the 
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feeling that one is or is not a brain in a vat decides that fact.”119 This suggests to Oshana, 
then, that the standards for autonomy “are not oriented around the value perspective of 
the person whose autonomy is at stake.”120  
The second reason that Oshana finds proceduralist views problematic is because 
such views conceptualize autonomy as a means to protect the “inner citadel” or the 
“unique, inviolable heart of agency” in each individual.121 However, from Oshana’s 
perspective, this understanding of autonomy is “empirically suspect,” because it suggests 
that there is a permanent, unchanging, presocial self.122 As we have seen, autonomy 
theorists, including Oshana, reject this understanding of the self. In addition, Oshana 
thinks that symbolizing the self as an “inner citadel” is questionable because it 
conceptualizes autonomy “as relegated to the background of social life – a characteristic 
that emerges behind an invisible partition that isolates each individual from the rest, 
overlooking entirely the social and relational dimensions of self-government.”123  
Lastly, because defenders of proceduralism locate autonomy in a person’s 
psychological states, they are committed to the view that the only factors which impede a 
person’s autonomy are psychological. For Oshana, there is more to autonomy that simply 
having the right psychology, because “people are not psychological states, and their 
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autonomy is a more complicated matter than that of their psychological states.”124 
Because proceduralist views cannot appeal to anything besides a person’s psychological 
states in the final analysis of whether one is autonomous, proceduralism offers a meagre 
view of autonomy. 
To further support her arguments against proceduralism (and to begin to make a 
case for socio-relational autonomy), Oshana offers several case studies. According to 
Oshana, each of the individuals in these case studies meets proceduralist standards and 
yet we have the intuition that they are not autonomous. For example, the first case she 
offers is the voluntary slave, which I noted in Chapter 3 is a standard problem case for 
proceduralist views.125 Oshana asks us to imagine a person who sincerely values and 
prefers to live as a slave and who makes a choice on the basis of this preference. Imagine 
that he has reflected on the historical processes under which his preference for slavery 
arose, and he feels no sense of alienation toward his commitment. In fact, let’s imagine 
that he is contented living as a slave. While proceduralists such as Christman would deem 
the voluntary slave as autonomous, Oshana thinks this is counterintuitive. A slave by 
definition is a person who must obey his master’s orders and who cannot decide for 
himself the direction of his life. How can a person be autonomous and yet have others 
decide his preferences for him? As we saw in Chapter 3, strong substantivists make 
precisely the same counterintuitive charge against proceduralist views. However, unlike 
strong substantivists, Oshana doesn’t think that we can trace the slave’s lack of autonomy 
to the content of his preference. Instead, Oshana argues that it is more intuitive to think 
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that the reason a contented slave isn’t autonomous is due to his social conditions. So, 
before I elaborate further on Oshana’s view, I want to consider first why she rejects 
strong substantivist views of autonomy.  
Oshana and Strong Substantivism 
 To help us understand her argument against strong substantivism, let’s introduce 
her second case study, which she calls “The Angel in the House”126 and which is similar 
to the example of Jane I have considered throughout this project. Oshana asks us to 
imagine a woman named Harriet, who prefers to be subservient to her husband in 
financial, intellectual, political, and personal matters. Imagine further that Harriet has 
reflected critically upon the historical process by which her preference arose and feels no 
alienation toward it. Harriet is contented and gratified to live as a subservient wife. As we 
have noted, proceduralists would deem Harriet autonomous because she meets the proper 
standards for critical reflection while strong substantivists deny that she is autonomous 
because of the content of her preference for subservience. As I discussed in Chapter 3, 
strong substantivist theorists would label Harriet as nonautonomous because she is 
making a special kind of moral mistake by choosing to be subordinate. She makes this 
kind of mistake because of her preference for subordination, the content of which 
prevents her psychology from “hooking up” or corresponding to an objective feature of 
the world, namely the fact that she is morally equal.  
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Oshana, however, denies the strong substantivist line of thinking outright.127 
Oshana acknowledges that the content of a person’s preferences are likely to indicate a 
diminished capacity for autonomy if she prefers (like Harriet) to be subordinate.128 But, 
on Oshana’s view, even if a person prefers to lead a highly independent way of life, the 
content of this preference isn’t constitutive (or partly so) of her autonomy. Let’s imagine 
Joan, who prefers to lead a highly independent life. Suppose that on the basis of this 
preference she chooses to be an investment banker, which way of life affords her with a 
high degree of financial security and the independence she seeks. Suppose further that 
Joan has critically reflected in the proper way on her preference. Strong substantivist 
theorists would say that Joan is autonomous because she has critically reflected upon her 
preference and her preference lacks the “wrong” content, i.e. content which prevents her 
psychology from hooking up with an objective feature of the world. However, even 
though she doesn’t put it like this, I take it that Oshana is making the following point 
about strong substantivism. If strong substantivists are correct that the content of a 
person’s preferences is constitutive (or partly so) of her autonomy, then we could lock 
Joan in a small room and maintain that she is autonomous. After all, she meets the 
standards for autonomy as set out by the strong substantivist view, i.e. she has critically 
reflected in the proper way and the content of her preference allows her psychology to 
correspond to the world in the proper way. As a result, she can act on the basis of this 
preference and will not make the kind of moral mistake that strong substantivists claim 
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render a person nonautonomous. Given that the locked room example is deeply 
counterintuitive, I take it that this is why Oshana thinks that strong substantivist theories 
are wrong to say that the content of a person’s preferences are constitutive of her 
autonomy, even if she prefers independence and self-sufficiency.  
So, from Oshana’s perspective, autonomy is not primarily a matter of a person’s 
psychological states nor is the content of a person’s preferences constitutive of her 
autonomy. Nevertheless, we are left with the intuition that Harriet (or the contented 
slave) is not autonomous, while someone like Joan is. According to Oshana, a socio-
relational view of autonomy bears out this intuition best: Harriet or the contented slave is 
not autonomous because “they lack characteristics that only a social theory of self-
determination can supply.”129 The reason that Harriet is nonautonomous is not because 
she lacks the proper psychological states and “not because she wants to be subservient, 
but because she is subservient. Her lack of autonomy is due to her personal relations with 
others and to the social institutions of her society.”130 Along the same lines, Joan is 
autonomous, not because she wants to be independent and self-directed, but because she 
is independent and self-directed. The reason that Joan is autonomous is because she lives 
in the proper kinds of social conditions that allow her to exercise de facto authority over 
her life. So, in contrast to the other leading views of autonomy, this is what is notable 
about socio-relational views: they claim that “autonomy is a condition of person 
constituted in large part by the social relations people find themselves in and by the 
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absence of other social relations”131 If a person lives in social conditions which prevent 
her from actually exercising de facto authority over her life, then she is not autonomous, 
no matter how well she critically reflects or the content of her preferences. To have this 
kind of authority on Oshana’s view, a person must meet both proceduralist and 
substantivist standards. I turn now to considering the conditions for autonomy as set out 
by Oshana. 
The Conditions for Socio-Relational Autonomy 
So, when does a person count as autonomous on Oshana’s view? Oshana 
identifies seven conditions that must be met in order to say that a person is globally 
autonomous. First, a person must exhibit what Oshana refers to as “epistemic 
competence.”132 Among the abilities necessary for this kind of competence are self-
awareness (or a sense of oneself as an agent) and self-reflectiveness (or the ability to 
think critically about one’s actions and act on them). Indeed, without these abilities, 
“autonomous choice and action cannot commence nor be sustained.”133 Critical reflection 
allows a person to assess her options and her circumstances and identify her reasons for 
acting, but it’s not necessary for her to endorse her “pro-attitudes” toward these 
reasons.134 Second (and closely related to epistemic competence), an autonomous agent is 
rational in the following three ways. 1) She is familiar with her social and psychological 
environment. 2) She is able to formulate or reformulate plans of action to realize her ends 
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or goals. 3) She is able to distinguish between ends or goals that are “favorable to self-
governance from those that disadvantage self-governance.”135  
 However, even if a person critically reflects upon her choices, activities, and 
relationships, it is possible that her reflections have been impaired. For example, a person 
may be subject to psychological impairments, such as “neurotic compulsion, excessively 
low self-esteem, systemic weakness of will, or addiction.”136 Therefore, the third 
condition for personal autonomy on Oshana’s view is that a person exhibits procedural 
independence. This means that nothing has impaired a person’s critical faculties in such a 
way to call into question the legitimacy of a person’s motivations (e.g. by being subject 
to browbeating).137 Moreover, a person exhibits procedural independence when the 
critical processes she uses to think about her value commitments are authentically her 
“own.” But, unlike many proceduralist theories, Oshana doesn’t think that authenticity is 
a matter of endorsing or having the right “pro-attitudes” toward the value commitments 
that emerge as part of the reflecting process. This is because a person may not endorse or 
may even feel alienated toward her value commitments and still be autonomous. 
 The fourth condition for autonomy is self-respect. An autonomous person not 
only values herself intrinsically and treats herself in ways that express this value, she 
expects that others will treat her in similar ways. A person with self-respect makes 
choices that reflect her intrinsic value and she regards herself as equally valuable and 
equally deserving of respect and consideration. When a person has self-respect, this 
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“inspires” others to treat her with respect.138 We disrespect a person when we treat her in 
a way that “makes light of her autonomy.”139 
 The fifth condition for autonomy on Oshana’s view is control. An autonomous 
person “has the power to determine how she shall live.”140 For example, she cannot live 
in social or political conditions which prevent her from making such determinations. 
Instead, an autonomous individual has the social status necessary to direct her life, free 
from coercion from others.141 But, autonomy on Oshana’s account isn’t simply a matter 
of having the right sort of control over one’s life, for there must be something over which 
a person can exercise control. A person may be in control, but if she has no options from 
which to choose, she isn’t autonomous. Accordingly, an autonomous person must have 
an adequate range of options open to her and this is the sixth condition for autonomy. 
However, this range of options is objectively (as opposed to subjectively) defined. It’s 
not enough that a person believes she has an adequate range of options. Instead, whether 
a person is autonomous in Oshana’s sense depends upon “an improvement or decline in 
the assortment, quantity, and arrangement of options” before her.142 Of course, different 
people will value and prefer different kinds of options, but within any adequate range of 
options, a person must have the option to “develop her capabilities (to hone her autonomy 
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skills)...and she must be involved in doing so.”143 Moreover, Oshana maintains that while 
it is possible for a person to be autonomous even though her options are restricted, we 
cannot say that a person is autonomous if the only option open to her is nonautonomy or 
if her options are “dictated by duress (be it physical, emotional, economic.)”144  
 The final condition for personal autonomy on a socio-relational view is 
substantive independence. While there are several components to this condition, all of 
them relate to the social conditions in which an autonomous individual lives. If a person 
is autonomous, then her social relations and institutions permit her a minimal degree of 
“social and psychological security.”145 If a person is fearful for her life due to high crime 
or if she subject to social interactions in which others see to dominate her, then she isn’t 
autonomous. Moreover, she must able to choose value commitments different from those 
around her, particularly “from those who have influence and authority over her.”146 An 
autonomous agent should not be expected to be responsible for the needs of those around 
her.147 However, this isn’t to suggest that autonomous individuals must be free of all 
intimate relationships or that engaging emotional or caring work is inconsistent with 
autonomy. Rather, I take Oshana is making a claim along the following lines: social 
traditions which (say) expect that women are solely responsible for child-rearing or 
domestic work, even at the expense of their own needs or interests, is inconsistent with 
autonomy. Finally, substantive independence also requires an autonomous individual to 
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have some degree of “financial self-sufficiency”148 and to have accurate information 
about the opportunities open to her. 
Oshana and Content-Neutrality 
Before I move on to my argument that Kymlicka’s view of autonomy in his 
liberalism is socio-relational, I want to raise a potential worry for her view concerning 
content-neutrality, which would in turn present a concern for my own argument. To 
understand what’s at issue, let’s briefly review the debate between Oshana and strong 
substantivism. As we have seen, strong substantivist views claim that the content of a 
person’s preferences is constitutive of her autonomy. Strong substantive views claim that 
someone like Harriet who prefers subordination is not autonomous when she makes a 
choice on this preference. This is why such views are not content neutral: they place 
normative restrictions on the kinds of beliefs an individual can hold and qualify as 
autonomous. In contrast, we have seen that Oshana thinks the strong substantivist line of 
argument is wrong to claim that a person’s preferences are constitutive of her autonomy. 
Instead, Oshana says that a person’s social conditions are constitutive of her autonomy. If 
so, this seems to suggest that Oshana thinks there is no need to introduce content 
restrictions on an individual’s preferences. This is because the content of one’s 
preferences doesn’t matter for determining whether a person is autonomous; rather, what 
matters for establishing a person’s autonomy is whether she lives in the proper kind of 
social conditions. Put another way, Oshana’s account of autonomy seems to embrace 
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content-neutrality and indeed, others have also suggested this as a feature of her view.149 
However, while I think that Oshana wants to say her account of autonomy is content-
neutral, it is my contention that it is difficult for Oshana to square her commitment to 
content-neutrality when she also claims the following:  
It is true that the socio-relational account I defend insists upon substantive 
constraints for an autonomous life. One of these constraints requires that an 
autonomous agent choose so as not to undermine the value of autonomy.150 
 
In making this claim, Oshana seems to be suggesting that there are restrictions on an 
individual’s preferences and beliefs.151 If so, then her account of autonomy is not content-
neutral.152 The thought goes something like this. Because individuals make choices on the 
basis of their preferences and beliefs and because they must choose in ways that support 
the value of autonomy, their preferences and beliefs cannot have content that undercuts 
the value of autonomy. If this line of thinking is right, then one implication of this 
restriction is that an individual cannot count as autonomous if she chooses to be servile or 
subordinate, even if she makes this choice on the basis of freely formed and endorsed 
preferences. Indeed, Oshana states this point out outright: “Persons whose freely formed 
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desires lead them to embark upon lives of servitude cannot be autonomous.153 Part of 
Oshana’s motivation in making this claim stems from the idea that what matters for 
autonomy is not whether a person is acting for “high-minded principle or degeneracy” 
but rather “what such a life yields for the person on a practical and daily basis.”154 For 
Oshana, Harriet or Jane may choose subordination, but given that their lives are highly 
restricted after making this choice, this is what is important for determining whether they 
are autonomous. Because they are restricted in this way, i.e. because they cannot exercise 
de facto authority over their lives, Oshana claims that they are not autonomous. So, if 
Harriet or Jane chooses subordination, and having successfully realized this choice 
cannot qualify as autonomous on Oshana’s socio-relational view, then I argue that her 
view places normative restrictions on the content of individuals’ preferences and beliefs.  
Oshana would seem to have good reasons for reject content-neutrality. One 
motivation concerns a logical problem. Let’s grant that Oshana is correct when she says 
that a person must exercise de facto authority over her life in order to qualify as 
autonomous. But, if a person chooses a life of subordination, in what sense can we say 
she is exercising this kind of authority over her life? After all, being subordinate means a 
person doesn’t make her own decisions about her life. So, if it seems if there are no 
content restrictions on the kinds of preferences that individuals can act on and qualify as 
autonomous on a socio-relational view, then it is open to individuals to choose 
subordination. In this situation, Oshana would have to say that a person who doesn’t 
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exercise authority over her life is autonomous, thereby undercutting her own position that 
a person is autonomous when she exercises de facto authority over her life. 
A second motivation for placing content restrictions on preferences stems from 
Oshana’s claim that socio-relational autonomy is a property of persons, and not an 
account of what makes one particular choice at a time autonomous.155 On Oshana’s view, 
socio-relational autonomy picks out a person who is autonomous over time, that is, who 
exercises authority over her life diachronically, not episodically. But, without content 
restrictions, it is open to a person to choose on the basis of any preference, even 
subordination. If a person is subordinate to the authority of another, she is not exercising 
authority over her life over time in the way that socio-relational autonomy demands.  
In light of these considerations, it seems fair to think that Oshana’s view of 
autonomy is not content-neutral. However, if her account of autonomy is not content-
neutral, this raises several problems, not only for Oshana’s own account, but for the 
central argument in this project as well. Let’s consider the former first. 
The first problem for Oshana’s view is this: by placing restrictions on the kinds of 
preferences and beliefs that individuals can hold and act upon and count as autonomous, 
Oshana’s view seems subject to the same kinds of objections raised for strong 
substantivist views related to its endorsement of content-neutrality. For example, one 
standard objection against strong substantivist views – which Oshana discusses – is that 
they justify paternalism into the lives of people who hold the “wrong” values.156 Here’s a 
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rough sketch of this line of argument. As I suggested in chapter three, because strong 
substantivist views incorporate a content restriction condition, these views effectively 
“dispense” preferences and beliefs to people. These views interfere in people’s lives by 
telling them what preferences and beliefs to hold, whether they feel a subjective 
commitment to them or not. Critics worry further that if the state adopts a strong 
substantivist view of autonomy, one which “dispenses” values to people, it seems that the 
state has prima facie justification for intervening in the lives of citizens who hold the 
“wrong” preferences. This concern is heightened further when we consider the enormous 
coercive power the state has at its disposal. So, if Oshana’s socio-relational view 
incorporates a content restriction condition and if strong substantivist views are 
problematic because this restriction provides prima facie grounds for paternalism, then 
Oshana’s socio-relational view is subject to the same paternalist objection that arises for 
strong substantivist views.  
The other problem for Oshana’s account of autonomy in rejecting content-
neutrality is this: Oshana herself wants to preserve the possibility that individuals in the 
liberal state can autonomously choose nonautonomy or subordination.157 But, by insisting 
that individuals must choose in accordance with the value of autonomy, which suggests 
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that individuals must hold preferences with particular content, Oshana seems to foreclose 
this possibility. Thus, Oshana’s commitment to content-neutrality seems at odds with her 
own intuitions about what a view of autonomy ought to accommodate. 
In response to my claim that her account of autonomy rejects content-neutrality, 
Oshana has offered the following consideration.158 On this line of thought, Oshana claims 
that her account of socio-relational autonomy doesn’t place direct content restrictions on 
preferences, but it does require individuals to have certain kinds of knowledge and we see 
evidence for this in her epistemic competence condition. For example, Oshana suggests 
that individuals must have the epistemic ability not only to distinguish circumstances of 
subordination from circumstances of equality, but to have accurate information about 
these different circumstances, e.g. information about the self-authority and self-
sufficiency involved in each circumstance. So, an individual need not make specific kinds 
of choices, but she must have a firm understanding of the practical implications of any 
choice open to her. I agree with Oshana that this kind of knowledge is important for 
autonomy. However, it’s not clear to me how this clarification of the epistemic 
competence condition establishes that her account is content-neutral and thus escapes the 
various objections I have raised against her view. Moreover, it’s not clear to me how this 
qualification squares with some of Oshana’s comments about the value of autonomy and 
choosing in accordance with it. In addition to the quotes I have already provided, Oshana 
also suggests that “it is not insensitive to state that the types of lives a properly 
autonomous person can live are limited.”159 My point in introducing quotes from Oshana 
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along these lines is this: Oshana seems quite clearly to reject content-neutrality, 
regardless of the qualifications she makes to the epistemic competence standard.   
 I’ve considered the problems that face Oshana’s socio-relational view if she 
embraces content-neutrality, and now I want to look at how this affects my own project. 
If it’s true that a socio-relational view places content restrictions on individuals’ 
preferences and beliefs, then Kymlicka’s view cannot be socio-relational. As I argued in 
chapter three, Kymlicka’s view of autonomy cannot be strong substantivist because these 
kinds of views place direct normative restrictions on the content of individuals’ 
preferences and beliefs. I argued that this kind of restriction is incompatible with a key 
element of Kymlicka’s liberalism, i.e. the endorsement constraint. If a socio-relational 
view imposes content restrictions on individuals’ preferences and beliefs, this would also 
stand in tension with the endorsement constraint. As a result, Kymlicka’s view of 
autonomy cannot be socio-relational. But, if a content restriction condition is unique to 
Oshana’s view, rather than a necessary feature of all socio-relational views, then this 
concern about Kymlicka’s view is unfounded.  
Kymlicka and the Ideal of Autonomy 
 In this section, I present my argument for the claim that Kymlicka’s view of 
autonomy in his liberalism is socio-relational. However, Kymlicka himself might 
disagree with my claim. In his 1992 paper, “Two Models of Pluralism and Tolerance,” 
Kymlicka argues that while there are several different conceptions of autonomy in the 




autonomy.160 A Millian conception of autonomy shouldn’t be confused with a Kantian 
conception, which requires us to regard autonomy as “intrinsically valuable because it 
reflects our rational nature.”161 Moreover, a Millian conception should not be seen as a 
view which asks us to view “non-conformist individuality as an intrinsic good.”162 
Rather, Kymlicka maintains that a Millian conception of autonomy “is simply the claim 
that autonomy enables us to assess and learn what is good in life and why. It presupposes 
we have an essential interest in revising those of our current beliefs about value which are 
mistaken.”163 Put another way, Kymlicka thinks that each of us has an essential interest in 
developing, examining, and possibly revising our preferences and beliefs about value. 
However, I think there are problems with framing his conception of autonomy as 
“Millian” for the following reasons. 
For one, as Kymlicka himself notes, “this label may be misleading, since Mill 
never used the term autonomy.”164 But, a more pressing issue is that Mill and his account 
of liberalism is more closely associated with a particular kind of perfectionist liberalism. 
As I noted in Chapter 1, defenders of perfectionist liberalism claim that liberalism is 
based upon an ideal of the good life and that the state is justified, perhaps required, to 
actively promote this ideal to citizen through laws and policies. A quick glance at Mill’s 
view of liberalism bears this out. For example, part of Mill’s argument for liberal rights is 
that they contribute toward individual self-development and the cultivation of 
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individuality.165 For Mill, the right to autonomy (along with education, conscience, and 
speech, among others) is a necessary element of individual well-being, for this right 
allows a person to acquire a strong sense of his individuality and to establish his 
commitment to character perfection. However, while Kymlicka agrees with Mill that 
liberal rights are necessary preconditions for leading a good life, he explicitly rejects the 
idea that they are necessary for citizens to develop their individuality.166 Perhaps most 
troubling is that Mill defends his liberalism in terms of utility, which means that in 
principle this permits the state to take steps to actively promote individual freedom in 
order to increase overall utility. While Mill certainly resisted the idea that the state should 
force individuals to be free, the worry is that state coercion in citizens’ lives could be 
easily justified on Mill’s view. Clearly, Kymlicka would reject this kind of imposition on 
individuals, even in the name of increasing their freedom, on the basis that it would 
violate the endorsement constraint. Lastly, given that critics have raised the concern that 
Kymlicka’s theory of liberalism licences state intervention in citizens’ lives (which I 
argue is unfounded in Chapter 5), I think it is in the best interest of Kymlicka to 
disassociate his view of autonomy (and his theory of liberalism more generally) from 
Mill or to refer to it as “Millian.” 
It is my contention that Kymlicka’s view of autonomy is socio-relational and 
here’s why. There are four main theories of autonomy: proceduralist, strong 
substantivism, weak substantivism, and socio-relational. Given that these are exhaustive 
of the views in the literature, then Kymlicka’s theory of autonomy must be one of 
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these.167 I have argued that Kymlicka’s view of autonomy is not proceduralist, not strong 
substantivist, and not weak substantivist. This leaves only socio-relational autonomy, so 
this is Kymlicka’s view. However, I’m not simply making a negative claim here about his 
view. When we examine the particulars of Kymlicka’s theory of autonomy, we find 
evidence to support my claim that his theory is socio-relational. As we have seen, socio-
relational views claim that social conditions are part of the defining conditions for 
autonomy. A person’s social conditions are partly constitutive of her autonomy. This 
means that a person must meet certain proceduralist standards, but it is also necessary 
that her social conditions meet certain normative standards in order that she qualifies as 
autonomous. Although Kymlicka doesn’t put it like this in his own discussion, I argue 
that his view upholds this way of thinking about autonomy. 
Consider first that Kymlicka doesn’t regard autonomy as primarily or only a 
matter of having the right kinds of psychological states or engaging in the proper critical 
reflection. To be sure, these play a role in his account of autonomy and he argues that 
individuals must arrive at their conceptions of the good through the right critical process, 
free from manipulation, coercion, or cognitive impairment.168 Moreover, Kymlicka thinks 
that individuals must have the ability to rationally revise their good through critical 
reflection. But, if Kymlicka thought (as proceduralists do) that autonomy is merely a 
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function of the critical processes one engages in, then he would not have introduced 
requirements for autonomy beyond this. As we have seen, Kymlicka also thinks that 
individuals must live in the proper kinds of social conditions in order to qualify as 
autonomous. In Chapter 2, I argued that Kymlicka thinks that social conditions are not 
merely causally related to autonomy, but part of the defining conditions of autonomy. On 
Kymlicka’s view, a person cannot, by definition, be autonomous unless certain social 
conditions are in place (and provided that she meets the other conditions for autonomy). I 
take it, then, that Kymlicka agrees with Oshana when she claims that “social relations do 
not just causally facilitate or impair the exercise of autonomy. Rather, appropriate social 
relations form an inherent part of what it means to be self-directed.”169 If this is correct, 
then Kymlicka’s view of autonomy is socio-relational. 
I want to suggest that we see further evidence of Kymlicka’s commitment to a 
socio-relational account of autonomy in his defense of group rights. According to 
Kymlicka, being autonomous involves (among other things) “making choices amongst 
various options, and our societal culture not only provides these options, but also make 
them meaningful to us.”170 Following Ronald Dworkin, Kymlicka claims that a societal 
culture has “‘a shared vocabulary of tradition and convention’ which underlies a full 
range of social practices and institutions.”171 So, for Kymlicka, there is a connection 
between autonomy and culture and this leads him to formulate an argument for group 
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rights.172 Membership in a societal cultural is necessary for a person’s autonomy.173  This 
is because a societal culture provides the context in which a person develops her capacity 
for autonomy and provides her with a range of meaningful options. According to 
Kymlicka, the necessity of this access to a societal culture is one reason that the liberal 
state is justified in providing group rights to minority groups. The societal cultures of 
some minority groups are at risk of extinction as a result of the pressures (some 
intentional, some not) exerted by the majority group. If a societal culture does go extinct, 
and if one necessary condition for autonomy is that individuals need access to a societal 
culture, then individuals who lack access to a societal culture will fail to be 
autonomous.174 On Kymlicka’s view, then, individuals require not only the ability to 
critically reflect, and rationally revise their good in order to be autonomous; individuals’ 
social conditions are partly constitutive of their autonomy. As we have seen, Kymlicka 
suggests that these social conditions include standard liberal rights and freedoms, e.g. 
association, conscience, privacy, apostasy, mandatory education,175 as well as access to a 
societal culture.176 I suggest that Kymlicka’s argument for group rights provides further 
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evidence that he thinks social conditions are part of the definition of autonomy, and not 
merely causally relevant.  
 At this point, I want to return to the problem I raised for Oshana’s socio-relational 
view in the section entitled “Oshana and Content-Neutrality,” because this issue has 
direct bearing on my argument that Kymlicka’s view of autonomy is socio-relational. I 
said earlier that Oshana’s socio-relational view is not content-neutral: it places 
restrictions on the kinds of preferences that individuals can hold and count as 
autonomous. As I noted, this poses two problems for Oshana’s account: it subjects her 
view to the same kinds of paternalism worries to which strong substantivist views are 
subject; and content-neutrality seems at odds with her own ideas about what kinds of 
cases a theory of autonomy should accommodate. In addition, if a socio-relational view 
places content restrictions on preferences and beliefs, then Kymlicka’s view cannot be 
socio-relational. This is because these kinds of content restrictions are inconsistent with a 
key part of his liberalism, i.e. the endorsement constraint. So, in light of the problems that 
face socio-relational autonomy because of its rejection of content-neutrality, I argue that 
a socio-relational view of autonomy should set aside content restrictions on people’s 
preferences and beliefs. Let’s call this view weak socio-relational autonomy and I’ll say a 
bit more about it, before I turn to considering how this move affects Oshana’s account. 
The view I advance here still retains most of Oshana’s key insights about 
autonomy. A weak socio-relational view still regards a person’s social conditions as 
constitutive of her autonomy, so the standards for autonomy introduced by Oshana must 
obtain. But, the key difference between Oshana’s account and a weak socio-relational 




beliefs. This move makes it possible for a person to choose on the basis of a preference 
for subordination, even slavery, and count as autonomous on a socio-relational view. 
Because a weak socio-relational view doesn’t impose content restrictions, then 
individuals can choose on the basis of any value commitments and count as autonomous 
(provided they meet the proper socio-relational standards for autonomy). So, here is one 
way that a weak-socio-relational view differs from Oshana’s own account. Oshana thinks 
that a person like Harriet can be autonomous and make an autonomous choice to be 
nonautonomous. However, once Harriet successfully makes this choice, i.e. she is 
actually subordinate, Oshana claims that Harriet no longer counts as autonomous. In 
contrast, I am denying this latter claim. I am claiming that Harriet can be autonomous and 
make an autonomous choice to be nonautonomous and still count as autonomous after 
she successfully makes this choice. On my view, Harriet will qualify as weakly socio-
relationally autonomous. So, we say that a person is weakly socio-relationally autonomy 
if she exercises or could exercise de facto authority over her life. To say that someone is 
exercising de facto authority over her life refers to a person like Joan, who prefers to lead 
an independent life and makes a choice to be an investment banker. To say that someone 
could exercise de facto authority over her life refers to someone like Harriet who chooses 
subordination and so is not currently exercising, but could exercise this kind of authority 
over her life. Let me note immediately the following three qualifications for labelling 
someone as weakly socio-relationally autonomous in this latter sense. 
First, when I say “could exercise de facto authority,” I want this to pick out 
people who in fact already have a developed capacity for autonomy and the ability to 




their capacity for autonomy and exercise it, this would be too broad, and we would be 
forced to regard as autonomous some individuals who we intuitively think are 
nonautonomous. So, this means that the severely disabled, people in comas, and children 
will not count as weakly socio-relationally autonomous because they could exercise de 
facto authority over their lives.  
The second qualification is this. A person who chooses subordination and counts 
as weakly socio-relationally autonomous because she could exercise de facto authority 
over her life must make her choice as an autonomous agent. To make this point clear, 
let’s return to the example of Harriet. On Oshana’s own account, Harriet is born and 
raised in a liberal state, in which she is socialized to believe in gender equality, has wide 
exposure to different ways of living, and is well-educated. Let’s call her Liberal State 
Harriet. Liberal State Harriet critically reflects upon the diverse value systems she has 
encountered and comes to decide that her good rests in subjecting herself to male 
authority. Before she makes her choice to live a subordinate life, we can regard Liberal 
State Harriet as weakly socio-relationally autonomous because she currently exercises de 
facto authority over her life.177 The reason that she exercises this kind of authority over 
her life is largely because of the social conditions in which she lives. After she makes her 
choice for subservience, however, I want to argue that we can continue to regard Liberal 
State Harriet as autonomous because she could exercise de facto authority over her life.178 
The reason that she could exercise this authority is due in large part to the social 
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conditions in which she lives.179 Even though Liberal State Harriet is not currently 
exercising de facto authority over her life, she lives in social conditions which would 
allow her to change her mind about her choice to live a subordinate life.180 In contrast, 
suppose Harriet was raised in a closed religious community (such as the Fundamentalist 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints in Bountiful), in which she is socialized to 
believe that women ought to be subordinate to male authority, has little contact with other 
people or points of view outside of her community (although she is certainly aware that 
people lead different kinds of lives), and receives limited education by members of her 
community. Let’s call her FLDS Harriet and let’s suppose that she makes a choice to be 
subservient to male authority. I argue that FLDS Harriet is not weakly socio-relationally 
autonomous even though she makes the same choice as Liberal State Harriet and here’s 
why. Before FLDS Harriet makes this choice, she does not exercise authority over her life 
and we can trace this lack of authority to her social conditions. After she makes her 
choice to be subservient, FLDS Harriet still could not exercise de facto authority over her 
life and we can again explain this inability by appealing to the social conditions in which 
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she lives.181  
The third qualification in claiming that a person is weakly socio-relationally 
autonomous if she could exercise de facto authority over her life is this. If Liberal State 
Harriet can autonomously choose nonautonomy and continue to be regarded as weakly 
socio-relationally autonomous, she must continue to live in the same social conditions she 
lived in before she made her choice. Here’s what I have in mind. Liberal State Harriet 
must continue to live in social conditions which would allow her the “exit option” to 
leave her current subservient way of living and re-exert de facto authority over her life, 
should she decide that her good doesn’t involve subordination. On a weak socio-
relational account of autonomy, Liberal State Harriet may autonomously choose to 
refrain from using her capacity for autonomy by choosing to be subordinate to the will of 
another. But, she must be able to retain her capacity and begin to use it again, should she 
decide that her good no longer involved submission to authority. Liberal State Harriet 
cannot submit to authority and never have the opportunity to change her mind and reject 
this way of living. 
I take it that Oshana would resist this line of argument on several different 
grounds. First, Oshana would argue that even if a person autonomously chooses 
nonautonomy and continues to live in social conditions which could allow her to exercise 
de facto authority over her life, “this is no guarantee that autonomy was not abdicated, 
and is no guarantee that autonomy is present after the fact.”182 There are two concerns 
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here. First, Oshana regards autonomy as a condition of persons who exercise de facto 
authority over their lives in an ongoing manner, rather than a latent capacity which can be 
“revived” at some later point. If Liberal State Harriet chooses nonautonomy, there is no 
guarantee that she will then be able to exercise it again after refraining from exercising it 
for an extended period of time. The second concern for Oshana is that I am altering her 
view too much, so that the fundamental elements of her theory no longer apply. For 
example, Oshana maintains that “a person who abdicates his choices is not fully 
autonomous, even if his choice-making capacity remains intact and even if he has the 
right to autonomy. The capacity must be exercised or actualized in order for a person to 
qualify as globally autonomous.”183  
In response to the first worry, I agree that there is “no guarantee” that Liberal 
State Harriet will be able to exercise her capacity for autonomy once she stops using it on 
a daily basis. However, I want to suggest that the “guarantee” standard is too high. After 
all, what steps would be required to “guarantee” this? My concern is that guaranteeing 
that a person could exercise her capacity for autonomy after a prolonged period of disuse 
would require paternalistic measures on the part of the state. Of course, the state is still in 
the position to foster social conditions to support someone like Liberal State Harriet, 
should she decide that she no longer wants to live a subordinate life. For example, the 
state could work to provide genuine exit options for her, in terms of creating social 
services to assist people like Harriet or supporting civic groups which provide aid. While 
it’s true that these measures won’t “guarantee” that she can exercise her capacity for 
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autonomy once again, they will provide the possibility and I think that is the best we 
should aim for. 
In response to the second concern, I will admit that the changes I suggest will 
alter Oshana’s theory of autonomy, so that autonomy will sometimes have to be regarded 
as a latent capacity, e.g. in cases in which individuals choose nonautonomy. However, I 
think this is a small price to pay, because the introduction of weak socio-relational 
autonomy puts Oshana in a position to sidestep the objections I raised earlier.  
First, because there are no restrictions on the kinds of preferences and beliefs 
individuals can hold and qualify as autonomous, this ensures that a weak socio-relational 
view is not subject to the paternalism objections I raised earlier. Because a weak socio-
relational account of autonomy is content-neutral, then the standard worry concerning the 
possibility of paternalism is forestalled. Recall that critics raised this line of objection 
against strong substantivist views on the grounds that “dispensing” the “right” 
preferences and beliefs to individuals provided prima facie justification for intervening in 
the lives of those who hold the “wrong” preferences. However, I have argued that a weak 
socio-relational account accepts content-neutrality, which means that it doesn’t prescribe 
to individuals the values they should hold or reject. So, it is open to individuals on the 
revised socio-relational view to hold, in some sense, the “wrong” values and yet still 
qualify as autonomous. If this is the case, then the worry about paternalism disappears. 
Moreover, even though a view of autonomy doesn’t “dispense” values to people, it’s still 




chosen, and this is precisely the point that Kymlicka makes in his liberal theory.184 
Oshana could respond along the following lines: even if a weak socio-relational 
view of autonomy gets around the paternalism objection that also plagues strong 
substantivist views, it may not avoid the kinds of objections raised against proceduralist 
accounts of autonomy. If a weak socio-relational view is content-neutral, then it seems 
that this account will be subject to the same objections as proceduralism. Recall that 
strong substantivist critics of proceduralism argue that such views result in a paradox 
because of their commitment to content-neutrality. If a person can choose on the basis of 
any value commitment, this means that it is possible for a person to choose subordination 
or even slavery and qualify as autonomous, provided she meets the standards for 
autonomy. But, strong substantivist critics ask: how can we regard as autonomous a 
person who chooses nonautonomy, i.e. a way of living in which she does not and cannot 
determine her preferences and beliefs for herself? In response, I argue that the force of 
this objection is weakened for the following considerations. A person such as Liberal 
State Harriet who chooses nonautonomy and counts as autonomous on a weak socio-
relational view has already determined her preferences and beliefs as an autonomous 
agent. Moreover, part of the reason that Liberal State Harriet counts as weakly socio-
relationally autonomous is that she continues to have a genuine range of meaningful 
options and opportunities open to her, even though she has chosen subordination. 
Because Liberal State Harriet had and continues to have the ability to exercise de facto 
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authority over her life because she could choose to reject her life of subordination, the 
paradox doesn’t seem as pressing. 
Conclusion 
One implication of my argument, however, is that the liberal state is placed in a 
position in which it makes moral judgments about citizens’ social conditions. A liberal 
state which adopts a weak socio-relational account of autonomy must make judgments 
about the kinds of social conditions that are constitutive of autonomy and must examine 
the social conditions in which citizens currently live, in order to determine whether these 
conditions are in fact constitutive of autonomy. For example, on a weak socio-relational 
account, a person’s social conditions must provide her with access to an objectively 
valuable range of options.185 But, if her social conditions fail to meet this standard, the 
liberal state must take steps to ensure that this range of options is available to her. 
Because the liberal state takes this kind of stand, this seems to run afoul of another 
fundamental aspect of Kymlicka’s liberalism: his commitment to neutrality. In the next 
chapter, I address the following concern: is it possible for Kymlicka to incorporate a 
weak socio-relational view of autonomy in his liberalism and uphold his commitment to 
neutrality? 
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SOCIO-RELATIONAL AUTONOMY AND NEUTRALITY 
Introduction 
This chapter concerns the compatibility between Kymlicka’s commitment to 
neutrality and to his socio-relational view of autonomy. As we have seen, one of the key 
motivating assumptions of Kymlicka’s liberalism is the claim that each of us has an 
essential interest in leading an objectively good life. What kinds of lives are objectively 
good? Kymlicka doesn’t offer us a particular theory of the good. But, he does argue that 
in order to lead an objectively good life, one must lead it from the inside, according to the 
beliefs that one deems valuable. Furthermore, he argues that being autonomous is one 
necessary condition for leading life from the inside. In this project, I’ve argued that 
Kymlicka’s account of autonomy is socio-relational. On this view, a person’s social 
relations are largely constitutive of her autonomy although having the proper 
psychological states and having the ability to rationally revise one’s good is also 
necessary for autonomy.  
However, another key aspect of Kymlicka’s liberalism is his commitment to 
neutrality. Theorists disagree over what neutrality is and what it means for the liberal 
state to be neutral, and I explore these various conceptions in this chapter. For now, we 
can say that, in rough terms, a neutral liberal state takes no stand on the moral worthiness 




defense of neutrality, which I elaborate on below. Following Thomas Hurka, I will refer 
to the three arguments as 1) the endorsement argument, 2) the revision argument, and 3) 
the distortion-of-values argument.186 Kymlicka’s arguments to justify neutrality are both 
interesting and controversial among liberal theorists because they rest upon substantive 
grounds. In plain terms: Kymlicka justifies neutrality in non-neutral terms. Liberal critics 
of Kymlicka challenge the viability of these arguments, although for different reasons, 
depending upon their liberal commitments. In this chapter, my plan is to focus upon the 
dispute between Kymlicka and political liberals. 
Political liberals, such as Jonathan Quong, agree with Kymlicka that the liberal 
state should appeal to neutral reasons to justify day-to-day laws and policies.187 However, 
Quong argues that approaches such as Kymlicka’s, which appeal to the revision argument 
to justify neutrality, are inconsistent.188 How can Kymlicka claim he endorses neutrality 
and yet justify the neutral state according to a non-neutral ideal such as autonomy? On 
Quong’s view, once we appeal to a particular conception of the good to justify neutrality, 
we are also endorsing perfectionism, whether we acknowledge it or not. As I noted in the 
introductory chapter of this project, perfectionism is the claim that there are certain ways 
of living that constitute human excellence (or perfection). A perfectionist state is one that 
is permitted, perhaps required, to promote these ways of living in its laws and principles 
(and perhaps less worthy ways of living penalized). Accordingly, a perfectionist state 
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rejects state neutrality because it would prevent the state from promoting objectively 
good ways of living. Given that one of Kymlicka’s arguments justifies neutrality by 
appealing to autonomy, Quong argues that the type of liberalism Kymlicka endorses is 
promoting the autonomous life. Yet, Kymlicka claims that he endorses neutrality, so 
Quong thinks there is an inconsistency in his view.  
Furthermore, the central claim I have argued for in this project – that Kymlicka’s 
view of autonomy in his liberalism is socio-relational – seems only to add force to 
Quong’s line of thinking. Because Kymlicka endorses a socio-relational view of 
autonomy, it seems plain that he is promoting a conception of the good life (and not a 
thin or proceduralist conception of autonomy). So, it seems that Quong is right about his 
claim that views like Kymlicka’s are not neutral and thus, inconsistent with Kymlicka’s 
own assertion that his liberalism embraces neutrality. 
In this chapter, I will argue that Kymlicka’s position on neutrality isn’t 
inconsistent. So, what makes mine a novel conclusion? I argue that once we get clear on 
Kymlicka’s particular approach to liberal neutrality, this will show that Kymlicka’s 
liberalism isn’t inconsistent, even though he subscribes to a weak socio-relational view of 
autonomy and appeals to it in order to justify his commitment to neutrality. To achieve 
my argumentative aims, however, it is crucial to be clear on 1) what the concept of 
neutrality involves and 2) what practical steps we might expect a liberal state to take in 
order to count as neutral. I begin with some conceptual ground-clearing and present a 




The Concept of Neutrality and Liberal Theories 
As I noted above, while perfectionist thinkers reject neutrality, comprehensive 
liberals such as Kymlicka and political liberals regard it as central to any reasonable 
liberal theory. In answer to the question “what does it mean for the liberal state to enact 
its commitment to this ideal?” theorists who endorse neutrality offer the following gloss: 
the liberal state must refrain from taking a stand on controversial debates over the good 
life. It should be clear that the idea of “taking a stand” must be explained and there is no 
shortage of liberal theorists who have taken on this task. However, one problem that 
tends to emerge in this debate is that theorists may not make the necessary distinctions 
when talking about neutrality and the ensuing debates often result in talking at cross-
purposes. In particular, although both Kymlicka and political liberals are committed to 
neutrality, defenders of these views are often lumped together in discussions about 
neutrality. This is misleading because while they share many of the same theoretical 
commitments, there is one fundamental disagreement between them. Even among 
political liberals, there is disagreement over what the commitment to neutrality requires, a 
disagreement which is not always brought to bear. With these thoughts in mind, I devote 
this section to unpacking these distinctions with the aim of pinpointing exactly what 
Kymlicka and political liberals are committed to with respect to the ideal of neutrality. 
But before I do this, I will say a couple of brief words about the appeal of neutrality itself. 
Generally speaking, defenders maintain that neutrality is an attractive ideal 
because it provides a bulwark against paternalistic intervention on the part of the state 
into the lives of citizens. It will be helpful to introduce the following distinctions about 




to act in certain ways for their own good.189 Defenders of neutrality, however, reject pure 
paternalism. They think that individuals in liberal states should be free to make their own 
choices, on the basis of conceptions of the good life they deem worthwhile, free from 
state interference. Because citizens make their choices against a backdrop of free 
institutions, we expect them to make different kinds of choices and endorse a wide-range 
of conceptions of the good life. In fact, we find this to be the case. In liberal states, there 
are some who pursue degrees in physics and work for NASA and others who are 
members of the Flat-Earth Society. With neutrality in place, however, the liberal state 
may not intervene in the choices of citizens on the grounds that these choices are not 
morally worthwhile or that citizens’ lives will go better if they are led to make different 
(that is to say more morally worthwhile) choices. Let’s note the following qualification. 
Does a commitment to neutrality mean that the liberal state can never get involved in 
citizens’ choices? This is too strong. Citizens’ choices (and the conception of the good 
life from which they arise) must be justice-respecting.190 Failing this, the liberal state is 
required by justice to step in and prevent a citizen from acting on a non-justice-respecting 
choice. For example, the state cannot justly permit Sally to act on her religious beliefs if 
these require her to engage in human sacrifice. Nor can the state allow Marcus to act on 
his beliefs about proper gender relations if these require him to physically prevent his 
wife from leaving the house. However, neither Sally’s nor Marcus’s case involves pure 
paternalism because the state isn’t coercing Sally and Marcus for their own good, but 
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rather for the good of others.191 Nevertheless, there is a wide-range of justice-respecting 
conceptions of the good, some of which lead individuals to live decent and dignified and 
perhaps righteous lives, while others lead ignoble or base lives.192 In either case, 
however, so long as a person’s conception of the good life is justice-respecting, the state 
committed to neutrality cannot actively interfere with citizens’ choices, even if a citizen 
leads a morally corrupt life.193  
I said earlier that a liberal state committed to neutrality takes no stand on the 
worthiness of citizens’ justice-respecting ways of living, so let’s unpack this idea now. In 
the literature, theorists have identified three different versions of the ideal of neutrality: 1) 
neutrality of aim; 2) neutrality of justification; and 3) neutrality of effect or outcome. I’ll 
begin with, in order to bracket, neutrality of effect. According to this version of the ideal, 
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neutrality of effect requires the liberal state to avoid policies or laws that give advantage 
to one conception of the good (or its adherents) over others. Put slightly differently, 
neutrality of effect holds that laws and policies must equally favour all citizens to pursue 
their conception of the good. Sometimes, perfectionist critics argue that this is what 
proponents of neutrality mean when they say the state should be neutral.194 But, this is 
not the kind of neutrality that Kymlicka or political liberals want to defend, on the 
grounds that it places such demands on the state to render the concept incoherent.195 
Neutrality is not an outcome-oriented ideal: it does not involve creating or avoiding 
particular kinds of results.196 Some ways of living will not or cannot flourish in the liberal 
state, even if justice-respecting. For example, those who defend deep-ecology “off-the-
grid” modes of living may find it difficult to maintain themselves over time, given the 
social and economic hardships in doing so.  This is unfortunate but expected in light of 
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the political and economic systems which influence the ability and costs involved in 
pursuing various religious or philosophical views.197 A liberal state committed to 
neutrality, however, is not obligated to mitigate the effects of its political and economic 
arrangements in order to ensure that all conceptions of the good have equal chance to 
flourish.  
So, if Kymlicka and political liberals do not endorse neutrality of effect, then they 
must endorse neutrality of aim or neutrality of justification or both. As I understand 
Kymlicka and political liberals, the ideal of neutrality they endorse combines both of 
these versions of the ideal.198 For both Kymlicka and political liberals, a liberal state must 
satisfy both neutrality of aim and neutrality of justification in order to be considered 
neutral. I’ll consider neutrality of aim first. A liberal state committed to neutrality of aim 
cannot intentionally promote or endorse through its laws and policies some ways of 
living over others.199 It is important to note that neutrality of aim is neither “toleration” 
nor “celebration of diversity,” for both of these involve making some kind of judgment 
about certain ways of life or value commitments.200 Rather, neutrality of aim requires that 
the state makes no judgments about citizens’ values or modes of living (with the caveat 
that these are justice-respecting.) Neutrality of justification, on the other hand, requires 
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that the state justifies its day-to-day policies and laws or basic, constitutional matters by 
appeal to neutral reasons. By neutral reasons, I mean reasons that are not grounded in or 
make evaluations of morally contested values or the superiority of some conceptions of 
the good life over others. For the ease of exposition, let’s stipulate that when I refer to 
neutrality, I intend this to refer to both neutrality of aim and neutrality of justification. 
If both Kymlicka and political liberals agree that the liberal state’s commitment to 
neutrality requires 1) rejecting neutrality of effect and 2) accepting neutrality of aim and 
neutrality of justification, where, then, does the disagreement between them arise? 
Kymlicka and political liberals disagree over how we justify the ideal of neutrality itself. 
Kymlicka thinks that we can and should appeal to non-neutral (or perfectionist) reasons 
to justify neutrality. As I noted earlier, Kymlicka offers three arguments in defense of the 
ideal. His strategy in each of these arguments is this. The state can either accept 
perfectionism or accept neutrality. Kymlicka wants to make clear the consequences that 
follow if the liberal state accepts perfectionism. Because these consequences are 
problematic from a liberal perspective, this should give liberals a reason to endorse 
neutrality. 
Kymlicka’s first argument is this: if the state embraces perfectionism, then the 
state violates the endorsement constraint and violating this constraint is self-defeating.201 
Recall that the endorsement constraint claims that a person’s life only goes well if he 
endorses his preferences and beliefs as valuable from the inside. Suppose the state claims 
that praying to God is a valuable activity, one which all citizens should engage in so that 
they lead good lives. Suppose further that some individuals deny that praying to God is 
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valuable, but are coerced by the state to pray to God. On Kymlicka’s view, however, 
once we force individuals to embrace certain preferences or beliefs, they aren’t leading 
good lives, even if they are wrong about the value of those preferences or beliefs. As 
Kymlicka points out, a perfectionist policy “may succeed in getting people to pursue 
valuable activities, but it does so under conditions in which the activities cease to have 
value for the individuals involved. If I do not see the point of an activity, then I will gain 
nothing from it. Hence paternalism creates the very sort of pointless activity that it was 
designed to prevent.”202 So, because perfectionism is self-defeating on Kymlicka’s view, 
we should reject it and accept neutrality instead.203  
The second argument Kymlicka makes in defense of neutrality is this: a 
perfectionist state interferes with citizens’ ability to rationally revise their value 
commitments.204 As I discussed in Chapter 3, Kymlicka thinks it is possible, perhaps 
likely, for individuals to be mistaken about their good. Given this possibility, individuals 
must be able not only to critically reflect upon their good as they currently understand it, 
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but to change as they see fit or reject it entirely.205 If the state is perfectionist and actively 
promotes through its policies one particular set of values or way of life, this makes it 
more difficult for citizens to rationally revise their beliefs, or perhaps prevents them 
entirely. As such, the absence of neutrality undermines one aspect of autonomy as 
Kymlicka understands the ideal.   
Third, and finally, Kymlicka argues that a perfectionist state leads to a distortion 
of values in the cultural marketplace. Kymlicka identifies three possible sources of 
distortion. First, given that a perfectionist state is committed to the idea that some ways 
of living are objectively good, it seems likely that the state will make public evaluations 
about the inherent worthiness of citizens’ ways of living. Of course, this isn’t to suggest 
that these evaluations will be made “through the secret or unilateral decisions of political 
elites,” but rather “arrived at through the collective political deliberations of citizens.”206 
Even so, the worry for Kymlicka is that some individuals will be unable to articulate and 
defend their conception of the good in a clear and compelling way. In this situation, “a 
perfectionist state may take action which will make their way of life harder to 
maintain.”207 Certainly, Kymlicka acknowledges that, even in a neutral state, individuals 
who cannot articulate or defend publically their conception of the good will not flourish 
or be able to persuade others about the value of their way of living. However, the 
difference is this: in a neutral state, individuals who are inarticulate or unpersuasive will 
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not be subject to “adverse state action” as they would be in a perfectionist state.208  From 
Kymlicka’s perspective, a perfectionist liberal state “raises the prospect of a dictatorship 
of the articulate and would unavoidably penalize those individuals who are 
inarticulate.”209 Put differently, Kymlicka thinks a liberal state which makes moral 
evaluations about the worthiness of citizens’ ways of living runs the risk of reifying 
“dominant ways of living, whatever their intrinsic merits,”210 rather than allow citizens 
the space to make their own moral evaluations of various ways of living offered in the 
“cultural marketplace of ideas.”211  
The second source of distortion is this: given that many cultural and social groups 
(e.g. women, Blacks, Hispanics, First Nations) in the liberal state are already 
disadvantaged and lack recognition for their values in the cultural marketplace, a 
perfectionist state which reifies the dominant ways of living only serves to further 
disadvantage these groups. As Kymlicka points out,  
Members of these excluded groups...have been unable to get recognition for their 
values from the cultural mainstream and have developed (or retained) subcultures 
for the expression of these values, subcultures whose norms, by necessity, are 
incommensurable with those of the mainstream. It is unfair to ask them to defend 
the value of their way of life by reference to cultural standards and norms that 
were defined by and for others.212 
 
The third and final source of distortion created in the cultural marketplace by a 
perfectionist state is this: because minority groups must persuade the majority about the 
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value of their ways of living, the former must appeal to arguments that are “palatable to 
the majority, even if that misdescribes the real meaning and value of the practices.”213 In 
other words, minority groups will have to appeal to ideals and concepts that the majority 
group can understand namely the ideals and concepts formulated by the majority group. 
As a result, the ideals and concepts of the dominant group are reinforced.  
So, while Kymlicka offers three arguments in support of neutrality, his second 
argument is one that will interest political liberals most, and this is what I plan to focus 
on. As I said in footnote 3, Quong isn’t responding directly to Kymlicka. Rather, Quong 
is saying that any antiperfectionist comprehensive liberal view that appeals to a non-
neutral ideal to justify neutrality will be rendered inconsistent. Given that Kymlicka is an 
antiperfectionist comprehensive liberal and given that one of his arguments in defense of 
neutrality introduces autonomy, then I take it that Quong’s arguments apply to 
Kymlicka’s view. Quong offers two arguments in defense of this claim, but for my 
purposes here, I’ll consider only the first argument.214  
On Quong’s view, once we appeal to particular ideals or conceptions of the good 
life to justify liberal neutrality, “such appeals are unlikely to establish why liberals must 
also reject perfectionism.”215 In other words, Quong thinks that Kymlicka cannot both 
incorporate a substantive ideal in his justification for neutrality and reject perfectionism. 
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Once Kymlicka appeals to autonomy and thus links liberalism with some conception of 
the good life, “the liberal state will unavoidably be acting for perfectionist reasons: it will 
be making decisions about what should be legal and illegal, what is just and unjust, based 
on a particular thesis about what adds inherent or intrinsic value to human life.”216 On 
Quong’s line of thought, the appeal to autonomy signals Kymlicka’s commitment to the 
idea that leading an autonomous life is good and to the idea that the state must take active 
steps to ensure that citizens can lead autonomous lives. To refer (as Kymlicka does) to 
the ideal of autonomy in justifying neutrality, political liberals think this effectively says 
to citizens: “As the state, we have identified what counts as a good life and we have 
arranged our institutions to support citizens’ ability to lead this kind of life. From the 
state’s perspective, citizens whose lives don’t align with the state’s conception of the 
good life are not living good lives and they cannot depend upon institutional support to 
pursue their ways of living.”  
To understand how he supports this claim, Quong asks us to imagine two people, 
Mike and Sara, who are arguing over the value of recreational drug use. On Mike’s view, 
recreational drug use is disvaluable, because it is a “perversion of human nature” to gain 
pleasure through chemical intoxication.217 Because recreational drug use debases 
humans, Mike thinks it should be criminalized. Quong claims that Mike is a perfectionist 
because “he believes that the state may legitimately act on judgments based in particular 
conceptions of the good life.”218 On Sara’s view, however, recreational drug use is not 
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disvaluable,219 provided 1) it is freely chosen and 2) harms no one else. As such, Sara 
doesn’t think that it should be criminalized: the state should stay neutral about 
recreational drug use, provided that individuals who engage in this activity choose it 
themselves and don’t harm anyone by engaging it. According to Quong, Sara is 
motivated by an intuition that the state cannot act on a particular conception of the good 
life to criminalize recreational drug use, i.e. a life involving no chemical intoxication. 
Quong thinks that Sara’s argument in support of this intuition would be something along 
the following lines: 
1. It is wrong to coerce someone for his own good. 
2. The reason it is wrong has to do with autonomy, the importance of being the 
authority of your own decisions and your own life. 
3. People disagree about perfectionist judgments and conceptions of the good life 
generally. 
4. The liberal state, being a coercive institution, should thus not act for perfectionist 
reasons when formulating its policies because this would infringe some people’s 
autonomy.220 
Quong thinks that anyone who offers this line of thought in defense of neutrality runs into 
serious difficulties. Here’s why. 
 Suppose that Mike denies that being autonomous is always more important and so 
“must always trump other considerations.”221 Mike may argue that, sometimes, pursuing 
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valuable goods is more important than autonomy, e.g. pursuing a “clean” lifestyle. 
However, suppose that Sara responds that “being the author of your own life is always 
more important than other conflicting considerations: autonomy must be the preeminent 
value or virtue in any flourishing human life.”222 If Sara takes this line of reasoning, 
Quong argues that it is open to Mike to point out that her argument is “no less 
perfectionist than Mike’s.”223 Both Mike and Sara appeal to a conception of human 
flourishing and both want to use the coercive power of the state to enforce this 
conception of the good life and so both are perfectionist. Let’s relate this argument back 
to Kymlicka. Along the same lines, Quong thinks that a view like Kymlicka’s is 
appealing to a conception of human flourishing, i.e. the autonomous life, and wants to use 
coercive state power to enforce and promote this conception of the good, by rearranging 
state institutions in such a way so as not to undermine one aspect of citizens’ autonomy 
(as Kymlicka understands the ideal). Therefore, according to Quong’s line of reasoning, 
Kymlicka’s view of liberalism is perfectionist. If it is perfectionist and yet Kymlicka 
claims that his liberalism also upholds the principle of neutrality, then, Quong argues, his 
view is inconsistent.  
Kymlicka and Neutrality: The Response to Quong 
In this section, I respond to Quong’s charge that Kymlicka’s view of 
antiperfectionist comprehensive liberalism is inconsistent. My response to Quong is this. 
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He is correct that Kymlicka’s view of liberalism is perfectionist but Quong 
misunderstands where the perfectionist elements arise in Kymlicka’s view. So, my first 
task is to get clear on where Kymlicka introduces perfectionist claims. Once we are clear 
on this, I will then argue that there is no inconsistency in Kymlicka’s account: he can 
endorse perfectionism and neutrality at the same time. Lastly, I will show that 
Kymlicka’s endorsement of weak socio-relational autonomy is well-suited to his 
particular approach to liberal neutrality.  
I said that the first order of business is to establish where Kymlicka brings in 
perfectionist considerations in his view. Following Hurka, we can refer to Kymlicka's 
view as indirect perfectionism because it claims that "the right-making characteristic of 
state actions is the promotion of objectively good lives, but this right-making 
characteristic doesn't figure in the best decision-making procedure for states.”224 Put 
otherwise, Hurka is claiming that Kymlicka incorporates perfectionist claims at what I 
shall call the “foundational” level, i.e. when we initially arrange and justify state 
institutions. However, once arranged, Kymlicka thinks the state should not appeal to 
perfectionist claims at what I shall call the “state” level, i.e. when formulating and 
justifying its day-to-day policies.  Now, on my reading of Quong, I take it that he 
assumes we cannot make this kind of distinction; once the state introduces perfectionist 
elements at the foundational level, the state cannot then refrain from introducing 
perfectionist considerations at the state level.225 However, according to Kymlicka, this 
latter claim doesn’t follow. The state can and should refrain from appealing to 
                                                 
224
 Hurka, “Indirect Perfectionism: Kymlicka on Liberal Neutrality,” 38.  
225




perfectionist ideals at the state level, even though the state initially arranges its 
institutions for perfectionist reasons. How does Kymlicka argue for this claim? 
Let’s begin by asking: why does Kymlicka think the state should appeal to 
perfectionist considerations when initially arranging its institutions? We can trace the 
reason for this to the two fundamental claims motivating Kymlicka’s liberalism: 1) that 
some ways of living are objectively better than others and 2) that each of us has an 
essential interest in leading an objectively good life. On the basis of these two claims, 
Hurka argues that Kymlicka thinks the state should promote this essential interest to its 
citizens, by arranging its institutions in such a way that citizens can lead objectively good 
lives.226 So, what’s an objectively good life on Kymlicka’s view? Kymlicka doesn’t 
provide us with a list.227 But, he does say that, for any objectively good life, it will be led 
from the inside and one necessary condition for leading life from the inside is that one is 
autonomous. So, anyone who is leading an objectively good life will be autonomous on 
Kymlicka’s view. Let’s put these ideas together: the state ought to promote citizens’ 
essential interest in leading good lives, and part of leading a good life is being 
autonomous, so, in the interest of promoting objectively good lives, the state should 
create the conditions necessary for individuals to be autonomous. 
What are the conditions necessary for autonomy on Kymlicka’s view? The central 
claim of this project is that Kymlicka incorporates a weak socio-relational view of 
autonomy in his liberal theory. As I argued in Chapter 4, this view claims that a person’s 
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autonomy is largely constituted by the kinds of social conditions in which she lives, in 
addition to meeting certain psychological conditions. More precisely, I argued that a 
person is weak socio-relational autonomous if her social conditions provide her (or could 
provide her) the ability to exercise de facto authority over her life. So, if the liberal state 
ought to create the conditions necessary for people to be autonomous, and if autonomy 
(on Kymlicka’s view) is largely a matter of living in kinds of social conditions that allow 
a person to exercise de facto authority over her life, then the state must create these kinds 
of conditions.  
So, Kymlicka thinks the state should appeal to perfectionist considerations at the 
foundational level, i.e. when initially arranging and justifying its institutions. Why, then, 
does Hurka claim that Kymlicka’s view is indirect? On Kymlicka’s view, once the state 
has created the social conditions necessary for autonomy, Kymlicka argues that the state 
cannot then act for perfectionist reasons. In other words, once the state creates these 
conditions, the state must be neutral. This is where the “indirect” aspect of Kymlicka’s 
perfectionism enters. On Kymlicka’s view, the state cannot in its day-to-day operations 
justify laws and policies with the aim of directly promoting objectively good ways of 
living. This is because Kymlicka thinks that state perfectionism is “likely to be 
counterproductive.”228 As we have seen, Kymlicka offers three arguments to this end: 1) 
state perfectionism violates the endorsement constraint and so is self-defeating; 2) state 
perfectionism interferes with one aspect of autonomy as Kymlicka understands the ideal, 
i.e. the ability to rationally revise one’s good; and 3) state perfectionism distorts the 
cultural marketplace. 
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So, Quong is correct that Kymlicka’s view of liberalism is perfectionist, but 
Quong is wrong about where the perfectionism is located in Kymlicka’s overall 
theory. Quong says that Kymlicka's state is perfectionist because 1) it appeals to 
perfectionist reasons to justify the initial arrangement of its institutions and 2) because, 
once arranged, the state cannot help but act for perfectionist reasons at the state level. 
But, Kymlicka's view denies the second claim for the reasons listed above. So, contra 
Quong, Kymlicka can consistently claim that his view is perfectionist and neutral at the 
same time because he denies that any perfectionist elements enter at the state level. Once 
it arranges its institutions, the state ought to be neutral: it must let people decide for 
themselves the kind of life they want to lead. Does this mean that individuals in 
Kymlicka’s liberal state can lead any kind of life, including morally bankrupt lives? Yes, 
provided that the life is justice-respecting. If Kymlicka thinks that the state should be 
neutral after having arranged its institutions, then he must also claim that the state is 
justified in intervening in citizens’ lives only when they endorse a non-justice-respecting 
conception of the good. For example, Kymlicka’s liberal state would be justified in acting 
in a non-neutral way if Sally’s conception of the good involved harming others. But, the 
state would not be justified in intervening in Sally’s life to prevent her from harming 
herself or from hold the “wrong” kind of value commitments, i.e. those that lead to live 
an objectively bad life.229 If Kymlicka argued that the state would be justified in 
intervening in Sally’s life because her way of living wasn’t objectively good, this would 
render Kymlicka’s view of neutrality inconsistent.  
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Moreover, Quong is wrong to say that autonomy forms the basis of Kymlicka’s 
perfectionism. Rather, the basis of his perfectionism is well-being, i.e. the essential 
interest each of us has in leading an objectively good life. For Kymlicka, what is 
ultimately valuable from the perspective of the state is that individuals are leading 
objectively good lives, not merely that they are autonomous. However, what is ultimately 
valuable from the perspective of individuals is something that is up to them to decide, and 
to make this decision, they need to be autonomous. In fact, Kymlicka thinks that 
autonomy is only instrumentally valuable because it helps people determine what is of 
ultimate value to them. Kymlicka, following Ronald Dworkin, thinks that “it puts the cart 
before the horse” to claim that only autonomy is objectively good.230 For Kymlicka, we 
don’t develop the capacity for autonomy simply because we happen to have it. Rather, we 
develop the capacity because it allows us to discover what is valuable in life.231 So, while 
autonomy is a fundamental aspect of Kymlicka’s view of liberalism, it’s important to 
note that it plays only an indirect role in his perfectionism. Kymlicka isn’t interested in 
creating conditions for people leading autonomous lives – full stop. Rather, Kymlicka 
wants individuals to lead objectively good lives and being autonomous is only one aspect 
of leading this kind of life. 
So far, I’ve explained how Kymlicka strikes a balance between a commitment to 
perfectionism and neutrality and I’ve argued that Quong is wrong to think that liberal 
views like Kymlicka’s are inconsistent. Now, I want to finish with some brief 
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observations about how Kymlicka’s endorsement of a weak socio-relational view is well-
suited to his unique approach to liberal neutrality for the following two reasons. First, as 
we have seen, Kymlicka thinks that the state should act for perfectionist reasons at the 
foundational level and arrange its institutions to create the conditions necessary for 
individuals to lead objectively good lives. Furthermore, he claims that all objectively 
good lives are led from the inside and one necessary condition for leading life from this 
inside is that a person is autonomous. However, as I have argued, the standards for weak 
socio-relational autonomy don’t place restrictions on the kinds of preferences an 
individual can hold and be autonomous. In fact, the view even allows individuals to 
endorse subordinate value systems and qualify as autonomous. If a person is autonomous 
on Kymlicka’s view, then she is leading her life from the inside. If a person is leading her 
life from the inside, she is living according to the values she deems important from her 
own perspective. According to Kymlicka, leading one’s life from the inside is a necessary 
condition for leading an objectively good life. So, a weak socio-relational view of 
autonomy doesn’t interfere with a person’s ability to lead an objectively good life. This is 
because its standards don’t interfere with a person’s ability to lead her life from the 
inside, by imposing restrictions on the kinds of values she can hold.232 
Second, because Kymlicka’s weak socio-relational view of autonomy claims that 
social conditions are largely constitutive of a person’s autonomy, it is well-suited for his 
particular approach to liberal neutrality. While neutrality is required at the state level, 
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Kymlicka thinks perfectionist reasons ought to play a role at the foundational level. At 
this level, the state is responsible for creating social conditions necessary for autonomy 
because being autonomous is a necessary condition for leading an objectively good life. 
A weak socio-relational view is apt because it provides a precise list of the kinds of social 
conditions that the state must create at the foundational level.  
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I’ve discussed Kymlicka’s weak socio-relational account of 
autonomy and his commitment to state neutrality. According to Kymlicka’s liberalism, 
the state should upholding neutrality of aim – it should not intentionally promote certain 
ways of living over others in its day-to-day policies and laws – and uphold neutrality of 
justification – it should appeal only to neutral reasons to justify laws and policies. One 
line of argument to which Kymlicka appeals to justify neutrality is autonomy: the state 
should be neutral because non-neutrality interferes with one aspect of the ideal as he 
understands it, i.e. the ability to rationally revise one’s good. Political liberals such as 
Quong have argued that this appeal renders a view of liberalism like Kymlicka’s 
perfectionist and therefore inconsistent with his other liberal commitments, i.e. to state 
neutrality. I have argued that this line of thinking is incorrect. While Kymlicka’s view is 
perfectionist, his overall view is not rendered inconsistent. Kymlicka can endorse 
perfectionism and neutrality at the same time. Furthermore, I have argued that his 






 The question I have addressed in this project is this: what theory of autonomy 
does Kymlicka endorse in his theory of liberalism? Because Kymlicka is an 
antiperfectionist comprehensive liberal, he regards personal autonomy as a crucial feature 
of liberal theory and an important factor in establishing the limits of state power. 
However, I argued that Kymlicka’s view of autonomy in his liberalism is incomplete. 
This is because he doesn’t specify the particular theory of autonomy he endorses. 
Kymlicka doesn’t explain whether his view is a procedural, or substantive, or a socio-
relational view and these exhaust the kinds of views of autonomy in the literature, so 
Kymlicka's view must be one of these. We need to know what kind of view of autonomy 
Kymlicka is advocating because there are different standards for different views, and the 
standards for autonomy tell us what conditions must obtain in order that a person counts 
as autonomous.  
 In Chapter 2, I presented one of the dominant views of autonomy in the literature: 
proceduralism. Proceduralist views claim that a person must meet psychological 
standards in order to qualify as autonomous. While proceduralist theorists disagree over 
what these standards are, I appealed to the proceduralist theory defended by John 
Christman. According to Christman, a person is autonomous if she were to reflect 




arose, and would not feel alienated toward it. Proceduralist views of autonomy are 
attractive because they are content-neutral: a person need not endorse or reject certain 
value commitments in order to qualify as autonomous. So, proceduralist accounts allow 
for individuals to hold the widest possible range of value commitments and be 
autonomous, including beliefs systems about the rightness of subordination. I argued that 
while Kymlicka agrees with some of proceduralism’s motivating commitments, his view 
of autonomy in his liberalism cannot be proceduralist. This is because proceduralist 
views of autonomy regard social conditions as merely causally related to autonomy. This 
means that proceduralists think that social conditions can impair the development of a 
person’s capacity for autonomy. But, proceduralists also think that it is both empirically 
and logically possible for a person to qualify as autonomous and live in oppressive social 
conditions. Accordingly, proceduralists think that a person can be autonomous, even in 
the absence of certain social conditions. However, I argued that Kymlicka’s view of 
autonomy regards social conditions as constitutive of a person’s autonomy. This means 
that if certain social conditions are missing from a person’s life, then that person does not 
qualify, by definition, as autonomous. So, because Kymlicka regards social conditions as 
constitutive of a person’s autonomy and proceduralist views deny this role for social 
conditions in determining whether a person is autonomous, then Kymlicka’s view of 
autonomy cannot be proceduralist. 
 In Chapter 3, I turned my attention to considering strong substantivist views of 
autonomy. According to defenders of this view, proceduralist views are deeply 
problematic because they allow for the possibility of autonomous slaves, provided that 




theorists maintain that it is more intuitive to think that some ways of living are 
incompatible with autonomous living, such as living one’s life subordinate to the will of 
another. On the basis of this intuition, strong substantivists claim that there are normative 
restrictions on the kinds of value commitments a person can hold and still qualify as 
autonomous. So, for example, a person can never endorse and act upon a commitment to 
living subordinate to another and be autonomous on a strong substantive view. A person 
is autonomous on this account if she critically reflects upon her value commitments in the 
right way and holds the right kinds of commitments, i.e. commitments which don’t 
prevent a person’s psychology from “hooking on” to the world in the proper way. 
Defenders of the view say that it is attractive not only because it explains one of the 
moral problems of oppression, it avoids some of the counterintuitive implications of 
proceduralist views. However, I argued that Kymlicka’s view of autonomy in his 
liberalism cannot be strong substantive. This is because the normative constraint 
condition is inconsistent with one aspect of Kymlicka’s liberalism, namely the 
endorsement constraint. So, Kymlicka’s view of autonomy is not strong substantivist. 
 In Chapter 3, I also considered whether Kymlicka’s view of autonomy is weak 
substantivist. Defenders of this view think the most reasonable theory of autonomy cuts a 
middle path between proceduralism and strong substantivism. Like proceduralist views, 
weak substantive accounts say that it is necessary for a person to meet competency and 
rational conditions in order to be autonomous, i.e. that he critically reflects in the proper 
way. But, in order to avoid the counterintuitive implications of proceduralist views, in 
which a slave can count as autonomous, weak substantivist defenders claim also that a 




regarding attitude, e.g. self-respect. So, like strong substantivist views, weak defenders of 
weak substantivist claim that there are conditions beyond an agent’s psychology that 
must obtain. However, unlike strong substantivist views, weak substantivist views deny 
that it is necessary to impose normative content restrictions on a person’s value 
commitments in order to be autonomous. As a result, a person can embrace subordinating 
value commitments and qualify as autonomous, provided that he meets the conditions for 
autonomy as set out by the weak substantivist view. I considered Paul Benson’s weak 
substantivist account of autonomy, which claims that a person must be a competent 
reasoner and must have proper regard for his authority as an agent. If one has this kind of 
authority, he can offer reasons for her actions and choices and respond to criticisms. 
Moreover, on Benson’s view, a person’s social conditions are partly constitutive of his 
agential authority. That is, it must be the case that he is embedded in social conditions 
which allow him to have and exercise agential authority. In response, I argued that 
Benson’s view is subject to similar objections that proceduralist views face. I argued 
further that in order for Benson to avoid this objection, it is necessary to introduce further 
substantive conditions in the weak substantivist view. However, once these further 
conditions are added, I argued that Benson’s view effectively collapses into a strong 
substantivist account of autonomy. As such, I suggested that there is a distinction without 
a difference between strong substantivist and weak substantivist views of autonomy. In 
terms of my overall project, this conclusion means that Kymlicka’s view of autonomy is 
not weak substantivist because such views are effectively the same as strong substantivist 




 In Chapter 4, I argued for the central claim of my project: that Kymlicka’s 
account of autonomy in his liberalism is socio-relational. I argued that Kymlicka’s view 
regards a person’s social conditions as constitutive of her autonomy and this is precisely 
what a socio-relational view claims. To help me make my case, I introduced a socio-
relational view of autonomy defended by Marina Oshana. On Oshana’s view, autonomy 
is a global (as opposed to occurrent) property of persons who are situated in particular 
social and political conditions. According to Oshana, a person’s social conditions are 
largely constitutive of her autonomy although it is necessary for certain psychological 
factors to obtain as well. A person is autonomous when her social conditions provide her 
the ability to exercise de facto authority over significant aspects of her life, including her 
choice of careers, personal relationships, political affiliations, psychological states, and 
health care, among others. According to Oshana, a socio-relational view of autonomy is 
preferable because it aligns more closely with our considered intuitions about autonomy. 
In contrast, she rejects proceduralist views as too thin, given that they focus only upon 
psychological factors to establish a person’s autonomy. She also agrees with those 
theorists who claim that proceduralist views have counterintuitive implications, given 
that they can accommodate the possibility of an autonomous slave. Furthermore, Oshana 
claims that strong substantivist views are problematic because they claim that the content 
of a person’s preferences is constitutive of her autonomy. For Oshana, it is not the 
content of a preference that renders a person autonomous (or not), but rather if the social 
conditions in which she lives allow her to exercise de facto authority over her life. 
However, I argued that while Oshana rejects strong substantivist views as inadequate, her 




commitments an individual can hold and qualify as autonomous. If this line of thinking is 
right, this raises not only concerns about paternalism for her view, this threatens my own 
project. As I argued in Chapter 3, Kymlicka’s view of autonomy cannot countenance 
content restrictions on individuals’ beliefs and preferences because this would violate the 
endorsement constraint, which is a fundamental feature of his liberalism. So, if Oshana’s 
socio-relational view imposes content restrictions, then Kymlicka’s view of autonomy 
cannot be socio-relational. 
 To address this issue, I argued that we can modify Oshana’s view and introduce 
what I termed a weak socio-relational account of autonomy. I argued that this view 
retains most of Oshana’s key claims about autonomy, but it upholds content-neutrality. A 
person is weakly socio-relationally autonomous if she exercises, or could exercise, de 
facto authority over her life.  This means that a person can choose to be nonautonomous 
and continue to be regarded as autonomous because she is nevertheless in a position in 
which she could exercise this kind of authority over her life. However, a person can 
choose nonautonomy and continue to qualify as autonomous, provided that she 1) makes 
this choice as an autonomous individual with an adequately developed capacity for 
autonomy and 2) continues to live in social conditions which could provide her the 
opportunity to reject her subservient way of living. While I acknowledged that Oshana 
may resist a weak socio-relational view, I argued that this move helps her to avoid the 
objections her own account faces as a result of rejecting content-neutrality. Furthermore, 
a weak socio-relational view of autonomy allows me to maintain the central claim of my 




 Finally, in Chapter 5, I considered a potential concern for Kymlicka’s overall 
theory of liberalism. If Kymlicka endorses this view of autonomy, does this pose a threat 
to another foundational aspect of his liberalism, namely his commitment to neutrality? 
While theorists are divided over what it means for the liberal state to be neutral, I argued 
that there are two key aspects to a commitment to neutrality. On the one hand, there is 
neutrality of aim: the state cannot intentionally promote to its citizens certain ways of 
living over others. On the other hand, there is neutrality of justification: the state must 
appeal to neutral reasons in order to justify its day-to-day policies and laws. While 
Kymlicka claims that his view upholds the ideal of neutrality, political liberals such as 
Quong argue that liberal views such as Kymlicka’s suffer from an inconsistency. This is 
because one of Kymlicka’s arguments to justify neutrality appeals to the ideal of 
autonomy. On this line of thinking, the state should be neutral because non-neutrality 
undermines one aspect of autonomy as Kymlicka conceptualizes the ideal, i.e. the ability 
to rationally revise one’s good. According to Quong, however, once neutrality is justified 
on this basis, the state cannot then refrain from acting for perfectionist reasons, i.e. act to 
promote the autonomous life. In other words, Quong thinks that justifying neutrality by 
appeal to a non-neutral ideal renders the state perfectionist. However, Kymlicka claims 
that his view of liberalism upholds state neutrality. So, on Quong’s line of reasoning, 
views of liberalism, such as the one Kymlicka endorses, is inconsistent.  
 In response, I argued that Kymlicka’s approach to liberal neutrality is unique 
because he claims that while the state should act for perfectionist reasons at the 
foundational level, the state should act for neutral reasons when formulating and 




approach as indirect perfectionism. So, while Quong claims that perfectionism at the 
foundational level cannot help by permeate into the state level, I argued that Kymlicka 
denies this claim outright. On Kymlicka’s view, the state can and must refrain from 
acting for perfectionist reasons in its daily operations because perfectionism at this level 
is 1) self-defeating, 2) impedes citizens’ ability to rationally revise, and 3) distorts the 
cultural marketplace of ideas. Given that Kymlicka denies that perfectionism at the 
foundational level will lead to perfectionism at the state level, Kymlicka’s view can 
embrace both perfectionism and neutrality without inconsistency. Moreover, I argued that 
Quong is wrong to say that autonomy forms the basis of Kymlicka’s perfectionism. 
Instead, I argued that well-being, i.e. the essential interest each of us has in leading 
objectively good lives, is the basis of perfectionist action at the foundational level. Lastly, 
I argued that Kymlicka’s endorsement of a weak socio-relational view is well-suited to 
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